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NOTICE TO CREDITORS IN ESTATE
PROCEEDINGS: WHAT PROCESS IS DUE?
DEBRA A. FALENDER-
A decedent's creditors are subject to short-term nonclaim statutes,
which require that a creditor preserve his claim by asserting it within a
short, specific time period that often expires before the debt. Tradition-
ally, publication notice has been held sufficient to notify such creditors
of the running of the short-term period. In an analogous setting, how-
ever, the United States Supreme Court held, in Mennonite Board of
Missions v. Adams, that a known or reasonably ascertainable mortga-
gee is constitutionally entitled to better-than-publication notice that its
rights could be terminated as the result of a tax sale. In light of this
decision, the Nevada Supreme Court held that an estate creditor is enti-
tled to notice reasonably calculated to inform the creditor of the short-
term period. Professor Falender argues that the Nevada decision was
correct and demonstrates that requiring mailed notice to known or
knowable estate creditors is constitutionally and practically sound.
Although adopting a better-notice rule would require altering the tradi-
tional duties and liabilities of representatives, heirs, and beneficiaries,
she concludes that the better-notice philosophy established by the
Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. was
properly extended by the Nevada Supreme Court's decision.
In 1950 the United States Supreme Court held, in Mullane v. Central Hano-
ver Bank and Trust Co., I that a "fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under
all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections." '2 The Court in Mullane
struck down a provision of a common-trust-fund statute that allowed notice
publication as the sole means of informing known trust beneficiaries of an action
that would settle their rights against the plaintiff trustee.3 In cases subsequent to
Mullane, the Court has invalidated other publication notice provisions. 4 In the
t Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis. A.B. 1970,
Mount Holyoke College; J.D. 1975, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis.
1. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
2. Id. at 314.
3. Id. at 320 (former N.Y. BAN~iNG LAW § 100-c(12)).
4. See, eg., Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983) (publication notice
inadequate to inform ascertainable mortgagee about a tax sale of the mortgaged property); Schroeder
v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (publication notice inadequate to inform ascertainable
property owner about condemnation proceedings); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112
(1956) (publication notice inadequate to inform known property owner about a proceeding in which
compensation for condemned property was to be fixed); cf. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982)
(posting on premises inadequate to inform tenant about forcible entry and detainer action). But cf.
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most recent such case, Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,5 the Court held
that notice by publication is constitutionally inadequate as the sole means of
informing a known or reasonably ascertainable mortgagee that its rights could
be terminated as the result of a tax sale.
6
Despite Mullane and its progeny, the prevailing wisdom in estate adminis-
tration--expressed almost universally in statutes7 and court opinions 8-is that
publication notice is constitutionally acceptable as the sole means of informing
estate creditors that they must file their claims against the decedent's estate or
Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951) (publication notice adequate to inform un-
known and unascertainable owners about escheat).
5. 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
6. Id. at 2712.
7. Nearly all states rely on publication notice as the best or only method to inform creditors of
the opening of an estate and the consequent running of the short-term nonclaim statute. A short-
term creditor nonclaim statute is defined infra at note 37. The nonclaim statutes are reviewed infra
at notes 36-56 and accompanying text. Many states substantially adopted Uniform Probate Code
§ 3-801, which provides only for publication notice to creditors:
Unless notice has already been given under this section, a personal representative
upon his appointment shall publish a notice once a week for 3 successive weeks in a news-
paper of general circulation in the [county] announcing his appointment and address and
notifying creditors of the estate to present their claims within 4 months after the date of the
first publication of the notice or be forever barred.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-801, 8 U.L.A. 351 (1983). The following statutes incorporate this provision
in substantial detail: ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.450 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3801 (1975);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-12-801 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.701 (West 1983); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 560:3-801 (1976 & Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 15-3-801 (1979); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A, § 3-801 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.3-801 (West 1975); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 72-3-801 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2483 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-801 (1978); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 30.1-19-01 (Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-801 (1978).
Most other states' statutes also provide for publication notice to estate creditors: ALA. CODE
§§ 43-2-60, 43-2-61 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2111 (1971); CAL. PROB. CODE § 700 (West
Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2101 (1974 & Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-704(a)
(1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-7-92 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, § 18-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-7-7 (Burns Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.230, 633.304
(West Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2236 (1983); KY. REV. STAT. § 395.520 (1984); MD.
EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 7-103 (1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.725 (West 1980); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 473.033 (Vernon Supp. 1985); NEV. REv. STAT. § 155.020(1)(b) (1983); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 553:16 (1974); N.Y. SURR. Cr. PROC. AcT § 1801 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1984);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-14-1 (1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.08 (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 58, § 331 (West Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 113.155 (1983); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3162 (Purdon Supp. 1984); M.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-18-1 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-630 (Law.
Co-op. 1976); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 30-21-13 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-2-306 (1984);
TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 294 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1201 (Supp.
1984); VA. CODE §§ 64.1-171 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.40.010 (Supp. 1985);
Wyo. STAT. § 2-7-201 (1977). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-205(a) (West 1981) (publica-
tion and "such other notice as the court deems necessary"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-7-145 (Supp.
1984) (posting on courthouse door is acceptable in lieu of publication); N.J. REV. STAT. § 3B:22-4
(1983) (the court "may, whether the estate be solvent or not, order the personal representative to
give public notice to creditors") (emphasis added); W. VA. CODE §§ 44-2-2, -4 (1982) (statutes pro-
vide that known estate creditors are entitled to mailed notice, but that "failure to mail, or to receive,
such notice shall not relieve any creditor, distributee or legatee of the duty to present and prove his
claim as required by such notice, nor in any way affect the proceedings pursuant to such notice");
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 859.07 (West Supp. 1984) (mailed notice of the time for filing creditors' claims
must be sent to the department of health and social services and to the county clerk of the county "if
the decedent was at the time of death or at any time prior thereto a patient or inmate of any state or
county hospital or institution").
Only a few statutues clearly provide that publication notice is the only notice that must be given
to estate creditors. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 472.100 (Vernon Supp. 1985) provides:
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their claims will be barred forever. Publication notice has been presumed to be
3. Service by publication is notice to all heirs and devisees, whether known or un-
known or whether residents or nonresidents of this state, spouses and to all creditors and
other persons interested in the estate.
4. Provisions in this code for notice to interested persons, other than by publication,
do not require such notice to creditors unless otherwise specifically required by the code or
by the court.
Similarly, S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 30-21-13 (1984) provides that published notice "shall be the
only notice to creditors required and shall constitute the notice to creditors referred to in other
statutes."
In some jurisdictions, even notice by publication may be dispensed with under certain circum-
stances. In Nevada, for example, when summary administration is available (when the gross value
of the estate does not exceed $100,000 and the court deems summary administration "advisable
considering the nature and character of the estate and the obligations thereof," NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 145.040 (1983)) notice by publication is required only if the cost of publication does not exceed
$25. Id. § 145.050(2). Should the cost exceed $25, "the notice shall be given in such manner as the
court may require." Id. In Tennessee, "[i]f the gross value of the estate under administration does
not exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) in personal and real property, advertisement in a newspa-
per shall not be necessary, but advertisement by three (3) posted notices. . . shall suffice." TENN.
CODE ANN. § 30-2-306(e) (1984).
In some states, claimants without notice are allowed to file their claims after expiration of the
claim-filing period. In California and Oklahoma a claimant who proves that he did not receive
notice because he was out of the state may file a claim at any time before the decree of distribution.
See CAL. PROD. CODE § 707(a) (West Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 333 (West 1965). A
Nevada court, when satisfied that a claimant had no notice, may allow him to file a claim at any time
before the final accounting. NEv. REv. STAT. § 147.040(2) (1979). See also CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 45-205(c) (West 1981) (court may extend, for cause, the time for a creditor to present a
claim, not to exceed thirty days); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.410 (West Supp. 1984) (failure to file
"shall not bar claimants entitled to equitable relief due to peculiar circumstances").
8. In the following cases, publication notice was deemed inadequate to inform known or ascer-
tainable estate creditors of the need to file their claims: Gano Farms, Inc. v. Estate of Kleweno, 2
Kan. App. 2d 506, 582 P.2d 742 (1978); Baker Nat'l Bank v. Henderson, 151 Mont. 526, 445 P.2d
574 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 530 (1969); Continental Coffee Co. v. Estate of Clark, 84 Nev.
208, 438 P.2d 818 (1968); Chalaby v. Driskell, 237 Or. 245, 390 P.2d 632 (1964); New York Mer-
chandise Co. v. Stout, 43 Wash. 2d 825, 264 P.2d 863 (1953); In re Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d
437, 302 N.W.2d 414 (1981). In June 1984 the Nevada Supreme Court became the first court to
hold publication notice inadequate to inform known estate creditors of the running of a nonclaim
statute. Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 98 Nev. 476, 653 P.2d 158 (1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 3530
(1983), on remand, 100 Nev. 70, 683 P.2d 20 (1984). The Moseley cases are discussed infra at notes
93-106 and accompanying text. Cf. In re Estate of Engbrock, 90 N.M. 492, 494, 565 P.2d 662, 664
(1977) C'[C]onstructive notice in a general publication of the hearing of the final account and report
is insufficient to meet minimum due process requirements" as to known tort claimants.). All post-
Mullane cases addressing the constitutional adequacy of publication notice to estate creditors are
discussed infra at notes 95-121 and accompanying text.
The post-Mullane scholarship regarding notice and estate creditors is sparse. Two student
works have suggested that due process after Mullane requires better-than-publication notice to estate
creditors. See Note, Notice Requirements in California Probate Proceedings, 66 CAL. L. REv. 1111,
1112 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, California Probate Proceedings]; Note, Requirements of No-
tice in In Rem Proceedings, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1257, 1270 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Note, In Rem
Proceedings]. Some scholars have concluded that Mullane does not apply to probate proceedings.
See, eg., Carson, Mullane and Probate, 50 MICH. L. REv. 124 (1951); Marlin & Martens, Informal
Proceedings Under the Uniform Probate Code: Notice and Due Process, 3 PROSPEcTus 39, 50-58
(1969). Most commentators have addressed the constitutionality of publication notice to heirs or
devisees rather than to estate creditors. Notice to heirs and devisees is discussed in: Fraser, Jurisdic-
tion by Necessity-An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 305, 316-17 (1951); Hay-
ward, The Effect of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company upon Publication of
Notice in Iowa, 36 IowA L. REv. 47, 57 (1950); Note, California Probate Proceedings, supra, at 1111
; Note, In Rem Proceedings, supra, at 1269-70; Note, The Constitutionality of the No-Notice Provi-
sions of the Uniform Probate Code, 60 MINN. L. REv. 317 (1976).
Most post-Mullane courts have upheld the constitutionality of publication notice of probate of
the decedent's will, even to known or knowable heirs and devisees. See, eg., In re Pierce's Estate,
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acceptable regardless of whether the creditor's name and address are known or
reasonably ascertainable. In many cases, this conventional interpretation has
been stated baldly without the support of reasoned analysis.9 In other cases, the
courts have concluded that notice publication is acceptable in the estate creditor
situation by distinguishing the factual contexts of Mullane and its progeny.10
Publication notice long has been accepted; inertia of tradition and reluctance to
change have helped shield it from attack. 1
245 Iowa 22, 60 N.W.2d 894 (1953) (court-prescribed notice of probate by one publication and
posting in three public places held adequate to those heirs whose names and addresses were readily
discoverable); Durham v. Walters, 474 A.2d 523 (Md. 1984) (publication notice of probate adequate
to heir whose identity had not been discovered by due diligence); Haas v. Haas, 504 S.W.2d 44 (Mo.
1973) (publication notice of probate adequate to heir whose address in a federal penitentiary could
have been discovered with reasonable diligence), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 928 (1974); see also In re
Estate of Decker, 194 Colo. 143, 570 P.2d 832 (1977) (publication notice of probate adequate to
devisees under prior will); Anson v. Estate of Anson, 399 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. App. 1980) (failure to
mail notice to known devisee until four days before expiration of claim-filing period did not affect
running of claim-filing period). But see Vogel v. Katz, 64 Ill. App. 2d 126, 212 N.E.2d 295 (1965)
(publication notice of probate inadequate when heirs' addresses could have been discovered by due
diligence); In re Estate of Barnes, 212 Kan. 502, 512 P.2d 387 (1973) (statutory requirement that
notice of probate be mailed to known heirs means that personal representative must use due dili-
gence to discover heirs' names and addresses); Hesthagen v. Harby, 78 Wash. 2d 934, 481 P.2d 438
(1971) (en bane) (publication notice of probate proceeding inadequate to inform heirs whose identi-
ties and addresses would have been revealed by reasonable inquiry); In re Estate of Phillips, 92 Wis.
2d 354, 284 N.W.2d 908 (1979) (statute required mailed notice to "any person whose post-office
address is known or can with reasonable diligence be ascertained"; complaining heirs' addresses were
held not known or reasonably ascertainable).
Published notice has been held inadequate at other stages of the estate proceeding, particularly
when an adversary hearing is required. See, eg., Michels v. Clemens, 140 Colo. 82, 342 P.2d 693
(1959) (en bane) (publication inadequate to inform devisee of final settlement decree); Allan v. Allan,
236 Ga. 199, 223 S.E.2d 445 (1976) (publication inadequate to inform devisee of spouse's petition for
year's support); First Natl Bank of Winnetka v. Alleman, 115 Il. App. 3d 224, 227, 450 N.E.2d
760, 762 (1983) (publication inadequate to inform 300 known or ascertainable cousins of will con-
struction action; not "unduly burdensome or oppressive" to require mailed notice); In re Estate of
Duval, 133 Vt. 197, 332 A.2d 802 (1975) (dictum; publication inadequate to inform beneficiaries of
decree of distribution); In re Estate of MacLean, 47 Wis. 2d 396, 177 N.W.2d 874 (1970) (publica-
tion inadequate as to parties affected by will construction action). But cf In re Estate of Pfeffer, 16
Ariz. App. 147, 492 P.2d 27 (1971) (no notice required to inform creditor of rejection of a claim);
Robinson v. Guman, 163 Conn. 439, 311 A.2d 57 (1972) (court-ordered publication notice to non-
residents was "legal notice" under statute reducing time for appeal of a probate court order from one
year to thirty days for anyone with "legal notice"); In re Estate of Shew, 48 Wash. 2d 732, 296 P.2d
667 (1956) (posting notice of spouse's petition for an award in lieu of homestead allowance afforded
due process).
9. See, eg., Baker Nat'l Bank v. Henderson, 151 Mont. 526, 529, 445 P.2d 574, 576 (1968)
("mhe Mullane doctrine is not applicable to probate proceedings."), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 530
(1969); Continental Coffee Co. v. Estate of Clark, 84 Nev. 208, 213, 438 P.2d 818, 821 (1968) ("We
are not convinced that [the Mullane] doctrine has applicability to our non-claim statute."); Chalaby
v. Driskell, 237 Or. 245, 248, 390 P.2d 632, 633 (1964) ("[W]e do not regard the [Mullane] doctrine
as applicable to the present case.").
10. See, eg., Brunell Leasing Corp. v. Wilkins, I1 Ariz. App. 165, 462 P.2d 858 (1969) (sug-
gesting that the in rem nature of a probate proceeding rendered Mullane inapplicable); Gano Farms,
Inc. v. Estate of Kleweno, 2 Kan. App. 2d 506, 509, 582 P.2d 742, 744 (1978) (notice under non-
claim statute "does no more than put into operation a special statute of limitations;" Mullane there-
fore inapplicable); New York Merchandise Co. v. Stout, 43 Wash. 2d 825, 264 P.2d 863 (1953)
(court distinguished Mullane as involving property rights); In re Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437,
302 N.W.2d 414 (1981) (nonclaim statute merely a statute of limitations, not an adjudication to
which Mullane applies).
11. See, eg., Gano Farms, Inc. v. Estate of Kleweno, 2 Kan. App. 2d 506, 510, 582 P.2d 742,
745 (1978) ("No one would suggest, we suppose, that the heirs must seek out the decedent's creditors
and notify them of the death [of the decedent].").
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The United States Supreme Court has not addressed directly the issue of
Mullane's applicability to estate creditor nonclaim statutes. 12 The Supreme
Court cases decided subsequent to Mullane, however, have steadily limited the
situations in which constructive notice alone is constitutionally acceptable.
13
These cases indicate that mailed notice or something equally likely to reach the
intended recipient is necessary to inform a known or reasonably ascertainable
intended recipient about a proceeding that will affect his property rights. More-
over, the Court has indicated approval of a better-than-publication-notice rule in
the estate creditor context. One week after deciding Mennonite Board, the
Court, in a memorandum opinion,14 vacated Continental Insurance Co. v. Mose-
ley (Moseley 1),x5 a Nevada Supreme Court judgment that had refused to apply
Mullane in favor of a known estate creditor. The Court remanded the case and
directed the Nevada court to reconsider its conclusions in light of Mennonite
Board.16
In June 1984 the Nevada Supreme Court rendered its decision on remand
in Continental Insurance Co. v. Moseley (Moseley I1). 17 In Moseley II, the Ne-
vada court applied Mullane and thus became the first to hold that a known
estate creditor's claim could not be barred by the running of a nonclaim statute
unless "more than service by publication ' 18 was afforded the creditor.
12. Although the Court has had the opportunity, it has declined to address the issue. Two
estate creditor notice cases presenting the issue were resolved procedurally. In Continental Ins. Co.
v. Moseley, 103 S. Ct. 3530 (1983), vacating and remanding 98 Nev. 476, 653 P.2d 158 (1982), the
Court vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Mennonite Bd. of Missions v.
Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983). The Court in Mennonite Bd. had applied Mullane and held that
publication notice was inadequate to inform a known or reasonably ascertainable mortgagee about a
tax sale. Mennonite Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2707. The Nevada Supreme Court originally had declined to
apply Mullane in Continental Ins. Co., holding that publication notice adequately informed a known
estate creditor of the need to file a timely claim. See infra notes 100-102 and accompanying text. In
Baker Nat'l Bank v. Henderson, 393 U.S. 530 (1969), dismissing appeal from 151 Mont. 526, 445
P.2d 574 (1968), the Court dismissed an estate creditor's appeal. It has been asserted that such a
dismissal constitutes an adjudication on the merits with precedential effect. In re Estate of Fessler,
100 Wis. 2d 437, 450 n.8, 302 N.W.2d 414,421 n.8 (1981) (citing L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAW § 3-5, at 58 n.8 (1978)).
Additionally, in Farrell v. O'Brien, 199 U.S. 89, 117-18 (1905) the Court held meritless a due
process challenge to a will probated without notice. Time has weakened, if not destroyed, the prece-
dential effect of this holding. See Comment, Due Process--The Requirement of Notice in Probate
Proceedings, 40 Mo. L. RPv. 552, 556-57 (1975).
13. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 2711-12 (1983) (publication
notice inadequate to inform ascertainable mortgagee about a tax sale of the mortgaged property);
Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 453-54 (1982) (posting on premises inadequate to inform tenant
about forcible entry and detainer action); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 211 (1962)
(newspaper publication and posted notice inadequate to inform ascertainable property owner about
condemnation proceedings); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956) (publication
notice inadequate to inform known property owner about a proceeding in which compensation for
condemned property was to be fixed). But cf. Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 432-35
(1951) (publication notice adequate to inform unknown and unascertainable owners about escheat).
14. Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 103 S. Ct. 3530 (1983) (mem.), vacating and remanding 98
Nev. 476, 653 P.2d 158 (1982).
15. 98 Nev. 476, 653 P.2d 158 (1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3530 (1983). The
memorandum opinion, as well as the procedure to grant certiorari, vacate, and remand, is discussed
infra at notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
16. Continental Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 3530.
17. 100 Nev. 70, 683 P.2d 20 (1984), on remand after 103 U.S. 3530 (1983).
18. Id. at 71, 683 P.2d at 21. Another court had held in In re Estate of Engbrock, 90 N.M. 492,
1985]
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This Article uses Moseley 11 as both a point of arrival and a point of depar-
ture. Because the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue presented in the
Nevada case 19 and because the Nevada court's reasoning was summary,20 part
II of the Article analyzes whether due process compels "notice reasonably calcu-
lated to apprise" estate creditors of the running of a nonclaim period. Part III of
the Article analyzes whether a statutory scheme requiring better-than-publica-
tion notice would be workable and supportive of the important estate adminis-
tration policies to be served.
The ultimate conclusion about the constitutionality of publication notice
depends on the workability of a better-notice rule. The Mullane Court recog-
nized that constitutionality must be determined "with due regard for the practi-
calities and peculiarities" of the situation;21 a due process decision that "would
place impossible or impractical obstacles in the way [of achieving a vital interest
of the state] could not be justified."'22 Thus, the Constitution would not compel
adoption of a better-notice rule that would be unduly burdensome or conflict
with substantial state interests.
This Article concludes that due process requires better-than-publication no-
tice to inform known or discoverable estate creditors that a short-term nonclaim
period has been invoked. Publication notice to such creditors is a "mere ges-
ture".23 Although a better-notice requirement would change long-standing
practice, such a requirement would be workable and would not impair signifi-
cantly the important state interests at stake.
I. BACKGROUND: THE NONCLAIM STATUTES
Analysis of the Mullane standard's applicability in the estate creditor con-
text requires an understanding of the course of an estate administration proceed-
ing and the operation of creditor nonclaim statutes.24 The following discussion
565 P.2d 662 (1977), that a known tort claimant was entitled to notice of the hearing on final distri-
bution. The court stated: "[W]e hold that with respect to known creditors, tort claimants, and other
interested persons, constructive notice in a general publication of the hearing of the final account and
report is insufficient to meet minimum due process requirements." Id. at 494, 565 P.2d at 664.
19. See supra note 12.
20. Ironically, the Nevada court applied Mullane's better-notice rule as summarily as the con-
ventional cases had refused to apply it. The court's anaylsis was limited to quoting Mullane and
citing Mennonite Bd. See Moseley II, 100 Nev. at 71, 683 P.2d at 21.
21. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15.
22. Id. at 313-14.
23. Id. at 315.
24. Estate administration statutes share common purposes and often derive from common
sources. These sources include the Model Probate Code, published in 1946 under the sponsorship of
the American Bar Association, and the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), promulgated in 1969 by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Despite their common purposes
and sources, the state statutes vary enough to make precise delineation of a single, typical estate
proceeding impossible. Even those states that have enacted the UPC in its entirety have altered it
somewhat. Compare COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-12-803(b) (1973) (creditor's claims barred "[w]ithin
one year after the decedent's death, if notice to creditors has not been published") and MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 524.3-803(a)(2) (West 1975 & Supp. 1984) (identical to UPC) (creditors' claims barred
"[w]ithin three years after the decedent's death, if notice to creditors has not been published") with
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-803(a)(2), 8 U.L.A. 354-55 (1983) (creditor's claims barred "[w]ithin three
[3] years after the decedent's death, if notice to creditors has not been published"). Compare UNiF.
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of the common features of estate administration and nonclaim statutes, there-
fore, serves as the background for an identification of potentially unconstitu-
tional creditor nonclaim notice provisions.
Administration of an estate involves collection of the decedent's assets, pay-
ment of the decedent's debts, and proper distribution of any remaining assets.
25
Administration begins only when the court issues letters testamentary or letters
of administration to a personal representative. 26 The court may appoint a per-
sonal representative only if it finds that the decedent is dead and either was
domiciled or owned property within the state or county where the court is
located.
27
Court involvement is also necessary to establish the validity of the dece-
dent's will. Generally, a will can not transfer title to the named devisees unless a
court admits it to probate.28 Probate of the will and issuance of letters often
occur at the same time; however, those two distinct events need not occur simul-
taneously or in any particular order, and neither is required. A will may be
probated for a decedent whose estate does not require administration; an intes-
tate estate may be administered by a personal representative; or an intestate's
estate may not require administration.
29
PROB. CODE § 3-306(a), 8 U.L.A. 251 (1983) ("no other notice of informal probate is required")
with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.3-306 (West 1975 & Supp. 1984) ("Notice of the informal probate
proceedings, in the form prescribed by court rule, shall be given under the direction of the clerk of
court by publication once a week for two consecutive weeks in a legal newspaper and by mailing a
copy of the notice by ordinary first class mail to all interested persons, other than creditors."). For a
general discussion of the effect of differences in state statutes, see UNIF. PROB. CODE art. III, Gen-
eral Comment, 8 U.L.A. 218 (1983) ("Variations in language from state to state can be tolerated
without loss of the essential purposes of procedural uniformity and flexibiltiy, if the following [listed]
characteristics are carefully protected in the redrafting process.").
25. On estate administration in general, see T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS
§§ 103-144 (2d ed. 1953).
26. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-103, 8 U.L.A. 226 (1983) ("[T"o acquire the powers and under-
take the duties and liabilities of a personal representative of a decedent, a person must be appointed
by order of the Court or Registrar, qualify and be issued letters. Administration of an estate is
commenced by the issuance of letters."). The court-appointed personal representative is the dece-
dent's official successor. In most jurisdictions, the personal representative is the only proper plaintiff
in an action to recover assets of the estate and the only proper defendant in an action against the
decedent by creditors. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 25, § 103, at 567, 570-71.
In some jurisdictions, statutes provide for dispensing with the administration of small or insol-
vent estates. No personal representative is appointed when these statutes are invoked. Instead, an
unofficial successor to the decedent's property is authorized to collect the decedent's assets by affida-
vit. See, eg., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 630-631.1 (West 1954 & Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1-
8-1 to -4.5 (Burns Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 867.01, 867.03 (West 1957 & Supp. 1984-85);
see also UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 3-1201, -1202, 8 U.L.A. 413-14 (1983). Under the no-administration
statutes, persons are protected if they in good faith turn over property to one with a proper affidavit.
Id.
27. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 25, § 107, at 595-98.
28. See, eg., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-7-24 (Burns 1971 & Supp. 1983) (With limited excep-
tions, "no will is effective for the purpose of providing title to, or the right to the possession of, any
real or personal property disposed of by the will, until it has been admitted to probate."); see also
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 856.13 (West Supp. 1984-85) ("No will shall pass any property unless it has been
proved and admitted to probate or informally admitted to probate under ch. 865."); UNIF. PROB.
CODE § 3-102, 8 U.L.A. 224 (1983) (With limited exceptions, "to be effective to prove the transfer of
any property or to nominate an executor, a will must be declared to be valid by an order of informal
probate by the Registrar, or an adjudication of probate by the Court.").
29. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 25, §§ 96, 103, 104, at 565-67, 577.
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A number of events might take place during administration of a decedent's
estate, some involving existing identifiable adversaries, some involving only po-
tentially existing or identifiable adversaries, and others involving no likely adver-
saries at all. 30 Eventually, when administration is complete, the personal
representative will petition the court for approval of his final account and a de-
cree of final distribution and discharge.3 1 The decree of distribution and dis-
charge ends all disputes over the administration and distribution of the assets.
32
Various events during administration may or may not need to be preceded
by notice, hearing, or court order, depending on the provisions of the decedent's
will and the provisions of the applicable statutes. Notice and hearing statutes
vary significantly, not only in their provisions regarding when notice and hear-
ing are required, but also in their provisions regarding acceptable notice. Many
probate code provisions for notice and hearing have been attacked on due pro-
cess grounds, particularly those that rely on publication or posting of notice to
inform known or identifiable adversaries of an event that might impair their
rights.33 Some of these publication notice provisions have withstood due process
attack, but others have been invalidated. 34 The estate creditor nonclaim notice
provisions, however, consistently withstood due process attack until June
30. A personal representative's petition to sell undevised, undesired property to pay established
creditor's claims is an example of an event with no likely identifiable adversary. A petition to deter-
mine heirship, brought by all the known and knowable heirs of the decedent, is an example of an
event with only potentially existing or identifiable adversaries. Events with existing and identifiable
adversaries include situations in which the personal representative has disallowed a creditor's claim,
or the heirs have contested the probate of a will, or certain devisees seek a more favorable construc-
tion of the will.
31. Administration is complete once the assets have been collected, debts and taxes have been
determined and paid, and the remaining assets distributed to the rightful successors. T. ATKiNSON,
supra note 25, § 143, at 797.
Different rules apply to unsupervised or informal personal representatives. Compare IND.
CODE ANN. § 29-1-7.5-4 (Burns Supp. 1983) (Neither a court accounting nor a decree of distribution
and discharge is authorized for an unsupervised personal representative.) with Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 865.16 (West Supp. 1984-85) (An unsupervised personal representative may have his accounts
settled in court.).
32. See T. Atkinson, supra note 25, § 143. Fraud or mistake may negate the apparent finality
of the decree in some jurisdictions. See, eg., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-1-21 (Bums 1971 & Supp.
1983) ("For illegality, fraud or mistake, upon application filed within one year after the discharge of
the personal representative upon final settlement, the court may vacate or modify its orders, judg-
ments and decrees or grant a rehearing therein."); see also UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-106, 8 U.L.A. 26
(1983) ("Whenever fraud has been perpetrated in connection with any proceeding or in any state-
ment filed under this Code or if fraud is used to avoid or circumvent the provisions or purposes of
this Code, any person injured thereby may obtain appropriate relief against the perpetrator of the
fraud or restitution from any person (other than a bona fide purchaser) benefitting from the fraud,
whether innocent or not.").
33. See, eg., cases discussed supra note 8. Many jurisdictions have provisions for informal or
unsupervised administration of a decedent's estate if interested parties consent. When an estate is
administered informally, court orders and hearings are unnecessary. See IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-
7.5-3 (Burns Supp. 1983) (an "unsupervised" personal representative may perform 27 enumerated
acts and "any other act necessary or appropriate to administer the estate" without order of the
court); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 865.01 (West Supp. 1984-85) (" 'Informal administration of estates'
means the administration of decedents' estates, testate and intestate, without exercise of continuous
supervision by the court."). Unsupervised administration is the ordinary method of administration
under the UPC. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-502, 8 U.L.A. 293 (1983) (Supervised administration
shall be ordered only if the decedent's will directs it or if the court finds it necessary.).




Creditor nonclaim statutes in both Uniform Probate Code and non-Code
states, although not uniform in detail, generally accept publication in a local
newspaper as a reasonable method of informing the decedent's creditors that
they must take affirmative steps to preserve their rights.36 Most states have two
distinct nonclaim provisions: a short-term provision of two to six months tied to
the opening of the decedent's estate and a long-term provision of one to five
years tied to the decedent's death.37 If a creditor's claim is not filed within the
relevant short- or long-term period, the claim against the decedent's estate or his
successors generally is barred.
3 8
35. Id.
36. See statutes discussed supra note 7.
37. The phrase "long-term provision" is not a term of art-it is used in this Article to identify
provisions barring claims if an estate is not opened within one to five years after the decedent's death.
The phrase "short-term provision" also is not a term of art-it is used in this Article to identify
provisions barring claims that are not filed within two to six months after the opening of an estate or
the published notice of such opening.
38. By far the most common result of failure to file a timely claim is the barring of that claim
against the estate and successors. The following statutes are substantially identical to UNIF. PROB.
CODE §§ 3-801, -803, 8 U.L.A. 351, 354 (1983), which provide that unfied claims are barred for-
ever: ALAsKA STAT. §§ 13.16.450, .460 (1972); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-3801, -3803 (1975);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-12-801, -803 (1973 & Supp. 1984); HAWAI REv. STAT. §§ 560:3-801, -803
(1976 & Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-3-801, -803 (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 3-
801, -803 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.3-801, -803 (West 1975 & Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 72-3-801, -803 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2483, -2485 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 45-3-801, -803 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-19-01, -03, (1976 & Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 75-3-801, -803 (1978).
In the following non-UPC states an unfiled claim also is barred forever: ALA. CODE § 43-2-350
(1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2601 (1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2102 (1979); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-704, -903 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 733.701, .702 (West 1983 & Supp. 1984); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. l1012, §§ 18-3, -12 (Smith-Hurd 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2239 (1983); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 396.025 (1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 473.360.2 (Vernon Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 28A-19-3(a) (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-2-310 (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1203 (Supp.
1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 859.01 (West 1971).
In Georgia, unfied claims are not barred forever:
Creditors failing to give notice of claims within three months from the date of publication
of the administrator's or executor's last notice shall lose all rights to an equal participation
with creditors of equal dignity to whom distribution is made before notice of such claims is
brought to the administrator or executor, and they may not hold the administrator or
executor liable for a misappropriation of the funds. If, however, there are assets in the
hands of the administrator or executor sufficient to pay such debts and if no claims of
higher dignity are unpaid, the assets shall be thus appropriated notwithstanding failure to
give notice.
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-7-92 (1981). Presumably, no assets remain "in the hands" of the personal
representative after final distribution, and claims thereafter are barred. A similar Oregon statute
provides that claims fied within four months after first published notice have priority, but claims
filed before twelve months after first published notice and before the personal representative ifies his
final account may be paid. OR. REv. STAT. § 115.005 (1983). In Iowa, failure to file "shall not bar
claimants entitled to equitable relief due to peculiar circumstances." IowA CODE ANN. § 633.410
(West 1964). Other states extend the time for filing claims under certain circumstances, but require
filing before distribution to avoid forfeit of the claim. CAL. PROB. CODE § 707 (West Supp. 1984) (if
claimant proves that he "had not received notice, by reason of being out of the state," the claim may
be filed at any time before a decree of distribution); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-205(c) (West
1958) (30-day extension may be granted for cause); NEV. REV. STAT. § 147.040(2) (1979) (when
court is satisfied claimant had no notice, claim may be filed any time before final accounting); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 333 (West 1965) (similar to California § 707); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-11-5
(1984) ("a creditor who, by reason of accident, mistake or any other cause, has failed to file his
claim, may [before distribution]. . . petition the probate court for leave to fie," and the court may
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Long-term nonclaim periods usually begin to run at the decedent's death
and usually bar all claims unless administration is begun within a defined period
of time after death. 39 No notice or court order is required to invoke their opera-
tion. Although the time periods vary, the shortest period is nine months 40 and
the longest is six years.
4 1
Short-term nonclaim periods usually begin to run either when letters are
issued to the personal representative42 or when notice of the issuance of the
letters is published in the appropriate newspaper.4 3 No jurisdiction allows a
grant leave in its discretion); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 30-21-20 (1984) (similar to California
§ 707).
In Dubuque Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 213 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1954), the court held that
South Carolina's nonclaim statutes "are designed for the personal protection of executors and ad-
ministrators, and do not bar a creditor who fails to comply with the statutes from enforcing his claim
against the persons into whose possession the assets of the estate have come." Id. at 121.
If a claim is filed properly and timely, the personal representative must decide whether to allow
it. See, eg., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-14-10 (Bums 1971 & Supp. 1983) (claims neither disallowed
nor allowed within 15 days after the claim-filing period are transferred for trial); see also UNIF.
PROB. CODE § 3-806, 8 U.L.A. 364-65 (1983) (failure to mail notice of disallowance within 60 days
after the claim-filing period is in effect a notice of allowance). Statutes often provide for notice to
claimants of the decision to disallow a claim. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2102(c) (1979)
(notification of rejection in writing delivered or mailed to last known address of the claimant); NEn.
R Ev. STAT. § 30-2488(a) (1979) (mailed notice of disallowance); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-806, 8
U.L.A. 364-65 (1983) (mailed notice of disallowance). But see In re Estate of Pfeffer, 16 Ariz. App.
147, 492 P.2d 27 (1971) (claimant must keep himself advised of the status of his claim).
39. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-803(a), 8 U.L.A. 354 (1983) provides that claims are barred "unless
presented. . . within three [3] years after the decedent's death, if notice to creditors has not been
published." One UPC state, Colorado, changed the three year period to one year. COLO. REv.
STAT. § 15-12-803 (1973). Although the period varies, the procedure is equivalent in the following
long-term statutes: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2601(d) (1971) (five years); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110'2,
§ 18-12(b) (1978) (three years); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-14-1(d) (Burns 1971 & Supp. 1983) (one
year); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.413 (West 1964) (five years); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2239(1) (1978)
(nine months); KY. REV. STAT. § 396.025 (1984) (three years); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.735
(West 1980) (six years); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 473.360(3) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (three years); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 556:29 (1974) (two years); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-19-3() (1984) (three years);
OR. REv. STAT. § 115.005(4) (1983) (three years).
40. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2239(1) (1983).
41. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.735 (West 1980).
42. The following short-term statutes provide that the time period begins to run when letters
are issued to the personal representative: ALA. CODE § 43-2-350 (1982) (six months); CAL. PROB,
CODE § 700(a) (West Supp. 1984) (four months); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2102(a) (1979) (six
months); ILL. R v. STAT. ch. 1101/2, §§ 18-3, -12 (1978) (six months); MD. EST. & TRusTs CODE
ANN. §§ 8-103, -104 (1974) (six months); N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 556:3 (1974) (six months). See
also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 859.05 (West Supp. 1984-85) (three months from court order fixing time for
barring of claims).
43. The following statutes provide that the time period begins to run when notice of the issu-
ance of letters is published in the appropriate newspaper: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2601(a) (1971) (six
months); D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-903(a)(1) (1981) (six months); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733-701 (West
1983) (three months); IND. CODE ANN. 29-1-14-1 (Burns Supp. 1983) (three months); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-2239(1) (1983) (six months); MIss. CODE ANN. § 91-7-151 (Supp. 1984) (90 days); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 473.033 (1978) (six months); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 145.060, 147.040 (1979) (sixty days
in summary administration, which is available in the court's discretion when the gross value of the
estate does not exceed $100,000; 90 days otherwise); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 331 (West Supp.
1984-85) (two months, or one month when decedent has been dead for five years); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 21-15-640 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (five months); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-2-310 (1984) (six months);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1203(a)(1) (Supp. 1984) (four months). UNiF. PROB. CODE § 3-803(a)(1),
8 U.L.A. 354 (1983), is a short-term statute that requires filing within four months after the first
publication of notice. One UPC state reduced this period to three months. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 30.1-19-03(1)(a) (Supp. 1983).
If publication of notice starts the running of the short-term period, publication fulfills the dual
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short-term statute to be invoked without court involvement in the issuance of
the letters.44
Short-term statutes rely on publication in a local newspaper to notify credi-
tors that they must file their claims at the appropriate place within the defined
time to preserve their rights to payment out of the estate.45 Some statutes pro-
vide that publication must be supplemented by mailed notice to heirs and devi-
sees;46 however, only one statute even mentions supplemental mailed notice to
known or discoverable creditors. 47 Even these minimal publication require-
ments sometimes are relaxed when the gross estate does not exceed a certain
value;48 some statutes excuse notice under certain conditions. 49 Additionally,
purpose of starting the period as well as informing the world of the stated facts. If appointment of
the personal representative starts the period running, publication serves only as a device for inform-
ing the world of the facts stated.
44. The court also must find that decedent is dead and either was domiciled in the court's
jurisdiction or owned property there. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 25, § 107, at 595-98.
In addition, in the following jurisdictions the court sends the material to be published: DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2101(a) (1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-7-7 (Bums Supp. 1983); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 473.033 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-2-306(a) (1984). In the other jurisdictions the
personal representative arranges for the publication: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2111 (1971); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. l10 1/2, § 18-3 (Smith-Hurd 1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-7-145 (Supp. 1984); NEv. REV.
STAT. § 147.010 (1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-630 (Law. Co-op. 1976). The personal representa-
tive arranges for publication under UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-801, 8 U.L.A. 351 (1983).
If the personal representative arranges for publication, he generally must file proof of publica-
tion with the court. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 333, 700(c) (West Supp. 1984); ILL. RFV. STAT. ch.
1101/2 § 18-3 (1978); MIss. CODE ANN. § 91-7-145 (1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-630 (Law. Co-
op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-2-306(d) (1984).
45. The following statutes, for example, describe the appropriate newspaper as a newspaper of
general circulation in the county in which the court is located: IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-7-7 (Burns
1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 145.050(2) (1983); see also UMF. PROB. CODE §§ 3-801, -804, 8 U.L.A.
351, 361 (1983). Some statutes require filing of claims with the court: IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-14-1
(Burns Supp. 1983); NEV. REv. STAT. § 145.060(1) (1983). Connecticut permits presentation to the
personal representative or to the court. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-205 (West 1981).
46. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2111 (1971) (must serve copy on "each heir and devisee
whose name and address are known"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733-212 (West 1983) (must serve copy on
"surviving spouse and all beneficiaries known to the personal representative"); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 29-1-7-7 (Bums Supp. 1983) (mail to heirs, devisees, and legatees listed in the "petition for probate
or letters"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2209 (1983) (mail to "each heir, devisee, and legatee. . . whose
name and address are known to [the petitioner]"). Often, however, there is no sanction for failure to
discover or list discoverable heirs and devisees. See, eg., Anson v. Estate of Anson, 399 N.E.2d 432,
435-36 (Ind. App. 1980) (holding that failure to comply with statutory requirement that notice be
mailed to heirs, devisees, and legatees, as well as be published, did not prevent the running of the
limitation period from the date of publication); W. VA. CODE § 44-2-4 (1982) (failure of representa-
tive to send required mailed notice in no way affects creditors' duty to file). Some statutes provide
for broader mailed notice: CAL- PROB. CODE § 700.1 (West Supp. 1984) (mail to Director of Health
Services upon death of medical assistance recipients); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 859.07 (West Supp. 1984-
85) (mailed notice to department of health and social services upon death of patient in state or
county institution).
47. W. VA. CODE § 44-2-4 (1982) provides that known estate creditors are entitled to mailed
notice; however, it further provides that "failure to mail, or to receive, such notice shall not relieve
any creditor, distributee or legatee of the duty to present and prove his claim as required by such
notice, nor in any way affect the proceedings pursuant to such notice."
48. See, eg., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2111 (1971) (posting is sufficient if estate's value does not
exceed $1000 exclusive of homestead); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2101(b) (Supp. 1984) (posting is
sufficient if gross personal estate's value is less than $12,500 and gross real and personal value is less
than $15,000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-2-306(e) (1984) (posting is sufficient if estate's value does not
exceed $1000); see also NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 145.040, .050 (1983) (court may direct the manner of
notice if estate's gross value is less than $100,000, and if publication costs more than $25).
49. See, eg., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1201(b) (Supp. 1984) (publication excused if court finds
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the personal representative often lacks authority to waive noncompliance with
the nonclaim provisions.50
Long-term and short-term nonclaim statutes normally apply only to debts
or other demands of a pecuniary nature enforceable against the decedent during
his lifetime;5 1 however, the statutes often apply to all such claims, whether the
claims are matured, liquidated, due, or absolute.5 2 Nonclaim statutes usually do
not apply to obligations incurred after the decedent's death, such as estate and
inheritance taxes, attorney fees, administration costs, and funeral expenses;
53
that no debts exist, or that all debts are known and can be paid, or that value of estate is less than
$2500 and is assigned for the support of the widow and children; however, assets distributed are
subject to claims later established).
The statutes of some states allow the period to be tolled for hardship on the part of the creditor:
CoNNm. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-205(c) (West 1958) (for cause, court may extend time for a creditor to
present a claim but not more than 30 days beyond original period); CAL. PROB. CODE § 707(a)
(West Supp. 1984) (if claimant proves by affidavit to court's satisfaction that he "had not received
notice, by reason of being out of the State," or that he filed a good faith claim in another proceeding
for the same deceased, claim may be filed within one year of the prescribed period's expiration and
before final distribution); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.410 (West 1964 & Supp. 1984-85) (claim-filing
provision "shall not bar claimants entitled to equitable relief due to peculiar circumstances"); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 147.040(2) (1979) (when the court is satisfied that claimant had no notice, claim may
be filed any time before final accounting); OKtA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 333 (West 1965) (if claimant
proves by affidavit to court's satisfaction that she had no notice by reason of being out of state, claim
may be presented at any time before entry of decree of distribution); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-11-5
(1984) ("a creditor who, by reason of accident, mistake or any other cause, has failed to file his
claim, may. . . petition the court for leave to file [before distribution]"; court may grant leave in its
discretion); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 30-21-20 (1984) (similar to Oklahoma § 333).
50. See, eg., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 859.47 (West Supp. 1984-85) (waiver only with consent of
heirs or beneficiaries affected); see also UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-802, 8 U.L.A. 352 (1983) (waiver only
with consent of all successors); see supra note 49. But see IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.410 (West 1964
& Supp. 1984-85) (personal representative may waive filing requirement).
51. See, eg., Vonderahe v. Ortman, 128 Ind. App. 381, 384, 146 N.E.2d 822, 825 (1958) ("[A
claim] is a debt or demand of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the dece-
dent in his lifetime and could have been reduced to a simple money judment."); Maxwell v. Yuncker,
419 So. 2d 580, 583 (Miss. 1982) ("[A]n inchoate and contingent claim involving the ownership...
of specific property" is not a claim which requires "a specific money demand due or to become
due."); see also ALA. CODE § 43-2-350(b) (1975) (claim-filing provision does not apply to heirs' or
legatees' claims).
No valid claim can be filed if the general statute of limitations has run at the time of the dece-
dent's death. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2601(b) (1971) ("No claim shall be allowed which was
barred by any statute of limitations at the time of the decedent's death."); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 859.15
(West Supp. 1984-85) ("A claim shall not be allowed which was barred by any statute of limitations
at the time of the decedent's death.").
52. See, eg., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2601(a) (1971) ("due or to become due, absolute or contin-
gent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract or otherwise"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2102(b) (1979) ("due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated,
founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-903(a)(1) (1981) ("due or to
become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other
legal basis") (same as UNiF. PROB. CODE § 3-803(a), 8 U.L.A. 354 (1983)); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-
14-1(a) (Burns Supp. 1983) ("due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliqui-
dated, founded on contract or otherwise"); Was. STAT. ANN. § 859.01(1) (West 1971) ("due or to
become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated"); see also UNiF. PROB. CODE § 3.
803(a), 8 U.L.A. 354 (1983) ("[d]ue or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliqui-
dated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis"). But see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 333
(West 1965) (claim that is not due, or is contingent, may be filed within one month after it becomes
due).
53. See, eg., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-14-1(a) (Burns Supp. 1983) (administration expenses ex-
cluded); Was. STAT. ANN. § 859.01(3) (West Supp. 1984-85) (claims for funeral and administration
expenses, claims for described taxes, claims of the United States, and claims based on tort excluded).
Other states, however, have special limitation periods for after-death claims against the estate. See
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and they usually do not bar the enforcement of liens and encumbrances, or pre-
clude assertions of ownership of property in the possession of the personal repre-
sentative.54 Tort claimants often are treated more liberally, especially to the
extent that insurance proceeds rather than estate assets will be used to compen-
sate the victim.55 Actions instituted before death usually are not affected by the
claim-ffling requirements.
5 6
One example demonstrates the potential unfairness of a short-term non-
claim provision that relies on publication notice. Creditor C loaned individual
D $5000 in 1983. Interest was to be paid quarterly for three years, and the
principal was due and payable in 1986. If D died in 1984 early in a quarter and
her estate was opened soon thereafter, a two-month nonclaim period might run
before a payment was missed. A six-month nonclaim period would extend over
only one missed payment. In either situation the creditor might lack sufficient
reason to inquire about the well-being of the debtor.57 The nonclaim statutes of
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2102(b) (1979) (within six months after personal representative's per-
formance is due); D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-903(a)(2) (1981) (within six months after claim arose); see
also UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-803(b), 8 U.L.A. 355 (1983) (within four months after personal repre-
sentative's performance is due).
54. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2601(e) (1971) (liens not affected); D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
903(b) (1981) (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-14-1(e) (Burns Supp. 1983) (same); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 21-15-640 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (obligations secured by mortgages or other liens not affected); see
also UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-803(c)(1), 8 U.L.A. 355 (1983) (proceedings to enforce mortgages,
pledges, or liens are not affected).
Applying a short-term nonclaim provision as a bar to the assertion of possessory interests in
specific property in the possession of the personal representative would create an inordinately short
adverse possession statute of limitations. See In re Estate of Toigo, 107 Ill. App. 2d 395, 404, 246
N.E.2d 68, 73 (1969) ("absurd results would occur" if actions to recover property were barred if not
filed within the claim-filing period). The Toigo court stated:
For example, suppose by mistake an asset which was never owned by the decedent was
inventoried in her estate and the claim period passed. No one would say that the mere
passage of time, and in this instance a relatively short time, somehow passed title to the
decedent, and therefore, the true owner could not have his property back due to the lapse
of time.
Id. Florida, however, bars claims for personal property in the possession of the personal representa-
tives. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.702(l) (Harrison 1983).
55. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2601(f) (1971) (tort claims excluded to extent of insurance
coverage); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-205(0 (West 1958) (claims founded in tort excluded); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-903(d) (1981) (claims covered by insurance excluded); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2,
§ 18-12(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85) (claims excluded to the extent estate is protected by liability
insurance); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-14-1(0 (Burns Supp. 1983) (same as Connecticut § 45-205(0);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2239(2) (1983) (tort claims excepted); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 859.01(3) (West
Supp. 1984-85) (same as Connecticut § 45-205(f)); see also UNin. PROB. CODE § 3-803(c)(2), 8
U.L.A. 355 (1983) (proceedings to establish decedent's liability excluded to the limits of insurance
protection only).
56. See, eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-205(f) (West 1958) (claims on which an action is
pending in court against decedent at time of death excepted); D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-903(c) (1981)
(actions instituted before death not affected); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-14-2 (Burns Supp. 1983)
(claimant need not file claim if pending action). But see Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 98 Nev.
476, 653 P.2d 158 (1982) (construing NEv. REv. STAT. ch. 145 (1979) to bar claim which was the
subject of an action pending at decedent's death).
57. C might reside in the same community as D, or C might reside in another county or state.
If C does not subscribe to and read regularly the newspaper in which a notice of the opening of D's
estate would be published, he is likely to be unaware of the need to file his claim. If the creditor is
unaware of the need to file, the creditor's claim will be defeated prematurely and unexpectedly by the
running of a short-term nonclaim period. It is possible that even those creditors who subscribe to
the appropriate newspapers could be unaware of the need to fie a claim. The debtor might have
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many states, however, would run even though the creditor was unaware of it,
even though his lack of awareness was reasonable, and even though the debt was
not due when D died. Significantly, as the law stands today, D's heirs, devisees,
and personal representative could know of the debt to C and intentionally take
no action, hoping that the nonclaim period would pass before C learned of D's
death.
5 8
It is axiomatic that a fundamental requirement of due process is the oppor-
tunity to be heard in defense of one's property and that notice is the best means
to maximize this opportunity.59 Therefore, if process is due, the known creditor
seems to have been denied due process if notice that his claim will be barred for
failure to act promptly has been given only by publication in a local newspaper.
The known creditor deserves better notice of the estate proceedings and the
claim-filing procedures so that he may decide whether to pursue his claim
against the estate.
6 °
Even short-term nonclaim statutes that require supplementation of pub-
lished or posted notice with mailed notice to heirs or devisees potentially are
unconstitutional, 61 except to the extent that the notified heirs and devisees also
are claimants. Statutes that permit or mandate that a court designate the type of
notice to be provided also seem unconstitutional to the extent that the court
chooses to allow publication or posting in lieu of notice more reasonably calcu-
lated to inform known or knowable creditors.62 On the other hand, for reasons
dealt with more fully in part II, long-term statutes probably do not deny due
moved to a new residence shortly before his death; the creditor would not know which paper to read
or how to contact the debtor.
If it is assumed that C knows the law and therefore expects the possibility of death and the
running of a short-term nonclaim period, the nature of the burden placed on the creditor still must
be considered. He must monitor regularly every relevant publication or contact the debtor person-
ally every two, four, or six months. It is also necessary to compare the creditor's burden to the
burden placed on the personal representative who invokes the short-term period on behalf of the
estate. According to the Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
320 (1950): "[I]t is too much in our day to suppose that each or any individual. . . does or could
examine all that is published to see if something may be tucked away in it that affects his property
interests."
58. An heir or devisee could pay the interim interest, either innocently or deviously, and the
creditor never would suspect that his right to the $5000 soon would be barred against the decedent's
estate or his successors. See New York Merchandise Co. v. Stout, 43 Wash. 2d 825, 264 P.2d 863
(1953) (spouse made payments on account to creditor after the decedent's death).
59. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (at a mini-
mum due process requires notice and opportunity for a hearing before deprivation of life, liberty, or
property); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (fundamental to due process is opportunity
to be heard, which includes notice).
60. "This right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is
pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest." Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
61. An exception to the potential unconstitutionality of a short-term nonclaim statute that re-
lies on publication or posting exists to the extent that the statute is not used to bar payment of a
claim. For example, no constitutional violation occurs if the personal representative or the dece-
dent's successors choose to pay the creditor regardless of whether the creditor had received notice or
had officially filed a claim; if the creditor is paid in full, he is not deprived of anything as a result of
lack of notice. For the same reason, no constitutional violation occurs if the estate did not contain
assets with which to pay the claim had it been filed.
62. Evaluating constitutionally questionable provisions raises an unsolvable dilemma. Identify-
ing such provisions is impossible without the background of the Supreme Court cases. A discussion
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process to the creditor, at least to the extent that they operate as statutes of
repose and provide a reasonable time for assertion of the claim.
II. Is NOTICE DUE?
A. The Issue
An estate creditor is entitled to due process only if state action impairs a
protected property entitlement. 63 The property-entitlement hurdle is straight-
forward and is easily overcome in the creditor nonclaim context. All traditional
interests in real and personal property, including contract rights and choses in
action, are protected by the due process clause.64 Courts examining the prop-
erty entitlement requirement have drawn distinctions between entitlements and
expectancies, however, and have protected the former but not the latter.65 The
claims to which the nonclaim statutes apply ordinarily are defined as debts or
demands enforceable against the decedent during his lifetime.66 Enforceable
debts or demands are protectible property entitlements, not mere expectancies.
67
of the cases, however, would not be meaningful without at least a tentative identification of constitu-
tionally questionable provisions.
63. The due process clause expresses the state action and property entitlement requirements:
"No state shall ... deprive any person of... property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
64. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 2711 (1983) (mortgagee's lien
not barred by tax sale of which mortgagee had no notice); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S.
422, 430-31 (1982) (cause of action to redress an employment grievance is protected property inter-
est); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 281-82 (1980) ("Arguably," a state tort claim is "a species
of 'property' protected by the Due Process Clause."); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft,
436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978) (property interest in continued utility service is protected while a disputed
bill remains unpaid); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) ("[A] student's legitimate entitlement
to a public education [is] a property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause."); Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972) (protected property interest in reemployment can arise
from de facto tenure system); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-13
(1950) (causes of action by trust beneficiaries "to have the trustee answer for negligent or illegal
impairments of their interests" are protected property rights). As to debtors and creditors in gen-
eral, see North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975) (deprivation of the use
of bank account during pendency of litigation violated fourteenth amendment).
65. See, eg., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982) ("The hallmark of
property.. . is an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed except
'for cause.' "); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("To have a property interest in a
benefit, a person. . . must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it."); see also Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due Process
of Law, 1974 DUKE L.L 89 (analyzing the entitlement and present enjoyment doctrines).
66. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
67. Using the now discredited right-privilege distinction, it might be argued that the govern-
ment is not obligated to allow claims to survive the decedent's death and therefore the government
may condition the grant of the privilege of claim survival upon whatever terms it desires. Cf Bailey
v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 57-59 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (procedural due process guarantees do not apply
to privileges as opposed to rights), affd per curiam, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (equally divided court).
The right-privilege distinction, however, can survive no better in estate administration and suc-
cession than elsewhere. "[U]nless the government were required to accord fair treatment of individ-
ual interests that could not be termed 'rights,' there would be almost no check on the power of
government to limit inidvidual freedom in society." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 528 (2d ed. 1983). The Supreme Court has made clear the general demise of the
right-privilege distinction. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 n.9 (1972) ("[T]he
Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once
seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights."); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 374 (1971) ("[Tihis Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn
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The state-action requirement is less straightforward. The fourteenth
amendment does not apply to the states unless the state government acts, di-
rectly or indirectly, in a manner that impairs a property entitlement. 68 The
existence of a state statute sanctioning a remedy or procedure does not trans-
form an otherwise private use of the procedure or remedy into the state action
required under the fourteenth amendment. 69 The transformation of private ac-
tion to state action will occur, however, when state courts and officials are in-
volved in effectuating a statutory procedure or remedy.70 The concept of state
action is such that a court could conclude that the running of short-term or
long-term nonclaim provisions is accompanied by insufficient government activ-
ity to trigger application of the fourteenth amendment; indeed, this conclusion
would be justifiable for long-term provisions. When a long-term provision bars
the creditor's remedy against his debtor's estate, no state action is involved other
than the prior legislative enactment of the long-term statute.7 1 No court or gov-
ernment official acts to aid the operation of the long-term statute. On the other
upon whether a governmental'benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.' "); Bell v. Bur-
son, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (holding that "relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to
terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a 'right' or a 'privilege.' "). But cf.
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 155 (1974) ("Mhe property interest which appellee had in his
employment was itself conditioned by the procedural limitations which had accompanied the grant
of that interest."). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Con-
stitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968) (reviewing the right-privilege distinction).
68. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (The fourteenth amendment "nullifies...
state action. . . which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or
which injures them in life, liberty or property without due process of law."). See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (text at supra note 63). Any judicial or administrative adjudication of the rights of
one person against another or against the world is government action that directly affects a party's
property rights. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1950)
(State courts' decisions in closing trusts were state actions affecting property entitlements.). Other
government action, however, such as the conduct of a government official acting in an official capac-
ity that impairs another's property rights or the enactment or enforcement of a provision in a statute
or ordinance that commands or strongly encourages conduct that impairs another's property rights,
will also trigger application of the fourteenth amendment. Compare Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 164-66 (1978) (creditor self-help is private, not state action, even though self-help is sanc-
tioned by state statute) with Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2756 (1982) (creditor
remedy sanctioned by state statute amounted to state action when state court issued writ and county
sheriff executed it).
69. See, eg., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-66 (1978) (creditor self-help with-
out court or sheriff involvement was private, not state action even though sanctioned by state
statute).
70. See, eg., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2756 (1982) (issuance of writ of
execution by state court and execution of writ by county sheriff held sufficient to satisfy state-action
requirement).
71. Publication of the statute affords the notice due when the legislation is first enacted. See
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 530 (1982). Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978),
supports the conclusion that the enactment of a law that merely legitimates action taken by a private
person will not be sufficient state action to trigger application of the fourteenth amendment. If the
enactment of a statute permitting or encouraging certain behavior involved sufficient state action to
take operation of the statute out of the realm of purely private activity and into the realm of the
fourteenth amendment, one would then have to analyze the connection between the action of the
state legislature and the impairment of the property entitlement.
The constitutionality of long-term nonclaim statutes will not be affected by the answer to this
state-action issue. If the state action is insufficient to trigger application of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the due process inquiry ends; the nonclaim provision will stand regardless of lack of provision
for notice, at least to the extent that no substantive due process violation is involved. See infra note
86. If the state action is sufficient to trigger application of the due process clause, however, then the
issue is whether the state action impairs the property entitlement of the creditor in a way that trig-
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hand, the state judiciary is involved to a significant degree when a short-term
nonclaim provision is invoked. All jurisdictions require a court order ap-
pointing a personal representative as a rerequisite to invocation of the short-term
nonclaim period.72 Under existing caselaw, 73 this should be sufficient judicial
involvement to constitute state action.
If state action sufficient to trigger application of the fourteenth amendment
exists, the courts must determine whether impairment of the estate creditor's
property entitlement occurs as the result of a proceeding to which Mullane
should apply. 74 If Mullane is applicable, due process requires adequate notice
before the nonclaim provision can terminate the creditor's rights.75 Alterna-
tively, a court might conclude that the property impairment results from the
operation of a properly enacted statute of limitation governing the abandonment
of property or the timeliness of the assertion of a property right.76 If nonclaim
provisions operate merely as statutes of limitations, they may terminate rights
gers application of Mullane's notice requirements; it probably does not. See infra notes 78-88 and
accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 42 &43 and accompanying text. The court order must have been preceded
by an adjudication of death and also by a determination of either domicile or ownership of real
property in the jurisdiction. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. In those jurisdictions in
which the court is responsible for publication of the notice, the state involvement is even greater. See
supra note 44.
73. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2756 (1982) (state action found in
issuance of writ of execution by state court and execution of the writ by county sheriff). Issuance of
the writ directly authorizing the remedy in Lugar is analogous to issuance of letters indirectly au-
thorizing invocation of the short-term provision. Execution of the writ by the Sheriff in Lugar is
analogous to invocation of the short-term provision by the court-appointed personal representative.
In both situations, judical and official involvement exists.
74. Another way to frame the analysis would be to ask what process is due considering all the
circumstances. Is it that process described in Mullane or is it that process afforded on the enactment
and operation of a statute of limitations? Ultimately, the question determinative of Mullane's appli-
cability is the same. In the framework presented in this Article, however, the general question, what
process is due, is reserved for discussion of the timing, method, and content of the required notice.
75. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Mullane re-
quired "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Id. at 314. The
Court has determined that notice is required before a court may conduct binding adjudication
whether a creditor's rights have been terminated by the operation of a nonclaim statute. In Texaco,
Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 536 (1982), the Court affirmed this point: "The Due Process Clause does
not require a defendant to notify a potential plaintiff that a statute of limitations is about to run,
although it certainly would preclude him from obtaining a declaratory judgment that his adversary's
claim is barred without giving notice of that proceeding." Id.
The question in Texaco was whether the mineral claimant deserved notice that the time period
provided in a mineral lapse statute had begun to run or was about to run and bar his mineral claim.
Id. at 533. The question in the estate administration setting is the same: whether the estate creditor
deserves notice that the nonclaim period has begun to run or is about to run and bar his claim.
76. In Texaco, Inc. v. Short, the Court, commenting on an argument that a mineral lapse stat-
ute operated to take private property without compensation, stated:
We have concluded that the State may treat a mineral interest that has not been used
for 20 years and for which no statement of claim has been filed as abandoned; it follows
that, after abandonment, the former owner retains no interest for which he may claim
compensation. It is the owner's failure to make any use of the property-and not the
action of the State-that causes the lapse of the property right. ...
Id. at 530.
Similarly, if the nonclaim provision is merely a statute that defines time limitations after which
a creditor's property interest is deemed waived or abandoned, it is the creditor's failure to file a
claim-and not any state action-that causes the termination of the creditor's property entitlement.
1985]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
regardless of the notice afforded creditors about the running of the limitations
period.
7 7
A true statute of limitations has two primary purposes: to afford repose to
potential defendants and to preclude the assertion of stale claims by plaintiffs. 78
Furthermore, a true statute of limitations ultimately operates to preclude un-
timely claims without the need for any private or state intervention. 79 The pre-
cipitating event that triggers the statute of limitations may be either an
occurrence or a nonoccurrence, and often it is an occurrence or nonoccurrence
of which the potential plaintiff is or ought to be aware.80 Regardless whether a
plaintiff actually is aware of the precipitating event, the statute may run and
constitutionally bar his claim.
8 1
A long-term nonclaim statute approximates a statute of limitations in sev-
eral ways. First, the long-term nonclaim period begins to run without private or
77. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 536 (1982) ("The Due Process Clause does not require
a defendant to notify a potential plaintiff that a statute of limitations is about to run. . . ."). Even
publication notice probably is not required as a matter of procedural due process if the nonclaim
provision is a mere statute of limitations. See Gano Farms, Inc. v. Kleweno, 2 Kan. App. 2d 506,
510, 582 P.2d 742, 745 (1978) ("[B]y analogy to a general statute of limitations, notice to a creditor
that [the time limitation] has commenced to run is not required at all. Under that reasoning, even
publication notice is not constitutionally necessary, and may be regarded as a legislative act of
grace.").
Even if the nonclaim provisions were held to be statutes of limitations, publication would be
required under some statutes to start the short-term nonclaim period running. Service of process, at
a minimum by publication, also would be required to establish the probate court's in rem jurisdiction
over the estate's assets. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
78. See Note, Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185-86 (1950) (quoting Order
of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).
The primary consideration underlying such legislation is undoubtedly one of fairness to the
defendant. There comes a time when he ought to be secure in his reasonable expectation
that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient obligations, and he ought not to be called on
to resist a claim when "evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared."
Id. The short periods "apparently [indicate] disfavor of the action or a policy in favor of particularly
quick settlement." Id. at 1180.
79. A "self-executing" statute of limitations is constitutional without regard to notice of the
occurrence of the precipitating event. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 536 (1982).
80. The precipitating event may be purely private, as in a common-law tort action between two
individuals, or it may involve the government, as in the rendering of a judgment that must be en-
forced within a defined period of time. The event may be an occurrence, as in a traditional inten-
tional tort action, or it may be a nonoccurrence, as in Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982)
(upholding the constitutionality of a mineral lapse statute).
81. See id. 536 ("The Due Process Clause does not require a defendant to notify a potential
plaintiff that a statute of limitations is about to run."). In many types of statutes of limitations, the
courts have imposed requirements to ensure that a reasonable plaintiff fairly can be deemed to have
notice of the accrual of her cause of action. For example, under statutes that apply to actions for the
recovery of possession of real estate, the courts have required that the defendant's possession be open
and notorious to recover possession from the possessor. Furthermore, notice underlies the appli-
caton of a "discovery" rule, in which the precipitating event is deemed to occur when the plaintiff
actually discovered or ought to have discovered the injury that forms the basis of her cause of action.
A statute of limitations, however, constitutionally may operate against one who did not or could not
discover the occurrence of the precipitating event. See Scalf v. Berkel, Inc., 448 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1983) (product liability statute of limitations that runs from date of delivery of the product
constitutionally can bar an action before injury occurs); Rod v. Farrell, 96 Wis. 2d 349, 291 N.W.2d
568 (1980) (malpractice statute of limitations begins to run when the negligent act occurs with ac-
companying injury, regardless of the date of discovery of the injury).
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state intervention.8 2 Second, after the nonclaim period has run without opening
the estate, the creditor's remedy against the estate is barred, 83 just as any rem-
edy is barred by the running of a statute of limitations. Last, the primary pur-
poses of a long-term nonclaim provision are the traditional dual purposes
attributed to statutes of limitations: to afford repose to the decedent's successors
and to preclude claims that have become stale because of the passage of time.
84
The one-year, two-year, or longer period of the long-term statutes is a reasonable
period for the creditor's discovery of the event precipitating the running of the
statute.85 It is an appropriate time period to afford real repose and to provide a
reasonable cutoff for claims that soon would become stale.86 Long-term non-
claim statutes therefore legitimately can be characterized as statutes of
limitations.
If characterized as statutes of limitations, long-term nonclaim statutes pass
constitutional muster even though they lack "notice reasonably calculated" to
inform known estate creditors of their invocation or operation.87 Even if it were
accepted that the state legislatures' enactment of the long-term statutes was suffi-
cient state action to trigger application of the fourteenth amendment, due pro-
cess nevertheless was afforded when the statute was enacted. Constitutionally
no notice is required under the long-term statutes beyond that required in the
law making process.8 8 Because long-term statutes are constitutional, the estate
creditor notice analysis in this Article focuses on short-term nonclaim statutes.
Short-term nonclaim statutes are not solely statutes of limitations. Short-
term provisions resemble statutes of limitations in that a time period runs to bar
an action by a potential plaintiff without a judicial determination that the time
period is running or has run.8 9 The time period, however, is extremely short-
ranging from two months to six months90-and it is not justified as clearly by
the dual purposes of repose and preclusion of stale claims. 91 Furthermore, the
short-term time period begins to run only on the entry of a court order opening
82. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
83. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
84. See Note, supra note 78, at 1185-86. •
85. If the statute did not provide a reasonable time, the creditor could make a substantive due
process argument that the time period was arbitrary, unreasonable, and not related rationally to a
legitimate state interest. See Note, supra note 78, at 1190-91. Most long-term provisions are related
rationally to legitimate state interests in repose and prevention of stale claims. It is possible, how-
ever, to contemplate a time period so unreasonably short as to be arbitrary, unreasonable, and unre-
lated to legitimate state interests. Id.
86. If it did not provide real repose, it would be unrelated to its underlying purpose. See supra
note 85.
87. See supra notes 77, 81.
88. See supra notes 77, 81.
89. See Gano Farms, Inc. v. Kleweno, 2 Kan. App. 2d 506, 508, 582 P.2d 742, 744 (1978)
(nonclaim statutes are special statutes of limitations).
90. See supra notes 37, 42 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. No reason exists to believe that a creditor's
claim would become stale more quickly when an estate administration was opened than when one
was not. Nor is there reason to believe that speedier repose is more necessary in the former circum-
stance than in the latter. Any jurisdiction that has both a short-term nonclaim statute (with a maxi-
mum operative period of six months) and a long-term nonclaim statute (with a minimum operative
period of one year) must have reasons for the enactment of the short-term period other than repose.
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administration of a decedent's estate. 92
Proceedings under a short-term nonclaim provision also do not fit the mold
of a traditional adjudication-a court battle ending in a court order resolving a
dispute. Mullane requires notice reasonably calculated to inform parties of the
pendency of a traditional judicial proceeding in which specific property rights
are to be resolved by a court's order; however Mullane has not been limited to
traditional judicial proceedings.
93
B. The State Cases
Before the Nevada Supreme Court's decision on remand in Moseley v. Con-
tinental Insurance Co. (Moseley II) 94 no appellate court had applied the Mul-
lane standards to overturn a statutory scheme accepting publication notice to
estate creditors when a short-term nonclaim provision has been invoked. Mose-
ley II involved a known estate creditor 95 whose sole notification of the running
of the short-term nonclaim period was by publication.96 The creditor allegedly
did not learn of debtor's death until one day before the sixty-day claim-filing
period was to expire; he did not file a claim until two days after it expired.97
When the estate refused to recognize his claim, the creditor filed suit, claiming
that the publication notice provision had not afforded him procedural due
process.98
The Nevada Supreme Court held in Continental Insurance Co. v. Moseley
(Moseley /)99 that publication notice was constitutionally sufficient. The court
emphasized Nevada's interest in providing, within its summary administration
92. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
93. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950). Several ade-
quacy-of-notice cases have involved traditional plaintiff-to-defendant notice. For example, in Mul-
lane better-than-publication notice was required to inform defendant trust beneficiaries of a court
proceeding initiated by a plaintiff trustee to determine finally certain of the rights of the beneficiaries
against the trustee. Id. In Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115-16 (1956), Mullane was
applied to mandate better-than-publication notice of the hearing to determine the compensation due
a known landowner whose land was condemned by plaintiff. In Armstrong v. Mango, 380 U.S. 545,
547 (1965), Mullane was applied to require notice to defendant father about the pendency of an
adoption proceeding. In Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 41 (1972), Mullane was applied to
require notice reasonably calculated to inform a defendant of the institution of an auto forfeiture
proceeding. In Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 447-51 (1982), Mullane was applied to require
better-than-publication notice to a defendant tenant who was being evicted from public housing.
94. 100 Nev. 70, 683 P.2d 20 (1984), on remand after 103 S. Ct. 3530 (1983), vacating 98 Nev.
476, 653 P.2d 158 (1982).
95. The creditor was plaintiff in a civil action pending against decedent at her death. The estate
had actual knowledge of plaintiff's claim against decedent; plaintiff's claim was listed in the petition
for summary administration pursuant to NEv. REV. STAT. ch. 145 (1983). Moseley 11, 100 Nev. at
70, 683 P.2d at 20-21. Apparently, the creditor had no knowledge of decedent's death or of the
opening of the estate until one day before the sixty-day claim-filing period expired. Moseley v. Con-
tinental Ins. Co. (Moseley 1), 98 Nev. 476,478, 653 P.2d 158, 160 (1982), vacated and remanded, 103
S. Ct. 3530 (1983).
96. The notice was published pursuant to the summary administration provision of NEV. REV.
STAT. § 145.050 (1983). The creditor conceded that the publication had complied with the statute.
Moseley I, 98 Nev. at 478, 653 P.2d at 160.
97. Moseley I, 98 Nev. at 477, 653 P.2d at 159.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 478, 653 P.2d at 160.
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provisions, "an expeditious and comparatively unencumbered means of accom-
plishing estate administration" for small estates1°0 and concluded that published
notice was "reasonably and sufficiently calculated to provide actual notice to
appellant."
10 1
The United States Supreme Court vacated the Nevada court's conclusion
10 2
and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the Court's decision in
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams.10 3 In contrast to its decision in Moseley
I, which was relatively lengthy and thoughtful, the Nevada Supreme Court's
decision on remand1° 4 was short and conclusory; it merely reversed its earlier
holding without adequate explanation. The court, after quoting Mullane's fa-
mous "elementary and fundamental requirement of due process" 10 5 language,
held:
In Mennonite, the Supreme Court applied [the Mullane] principle
and found that mere constructive notice afforded inadequate due pro-
cess to a readily ascertainable mortgage holder. Given the facts of this
case and the holding in Mennonite and Mullane, we conclude that
more than service by publication was required in order to afford due
process to appellant. We therefore reverse the orders of the district
courts and remand these matters for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
1 06
Despite its lack of analysis, the Nevada court's decision in Moseley II is signifi-
cant because it was the first decision to hold that due process requires more than
publication notice to known estate creditors.'
07
100. At the time of Moseley 1, estates less than $60,000 qualified for summary administration.
See id. The summary administration threshold has been increased to $100,000. See NEv. REv.
STAT. § 145.040 (1983).
101. Moseley I, 98 Nev. at 478, 653 P.2d at 160.
102. Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 103 S. Ct. 3530 (1983) (mem.), vacating and remanding 98
Nev. 476, 653 P.2d 158 (1982).
103. Id. The decision in Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983), was
rendered one week prior to the decision to vacate and remand Moseley . The Court's procedure-
granting certiorari, vacating, and remanding in light of Mennonite Bd.-does not indicate definitely
that the Supreme Court has held, or will hold, Mullane applicable in the circumstances of the re-
manded case. The decision to grant certiorari, vacate, and remand is voted on by the Court, and an
opinion is rendered in memorandum form. The procedure commonly is used when a decision, such
as Mennonite Bd., has been rendered that possibly is relevant to the issue presented in the remanded
case. The Court remands so that the lower court can reconsider the issue in light of the new, possi-
bly relevant, holding. If the lower court's decision on remand is not appealed a second time to the
Supreme Court, the Court never directly addresses the issue presented in the remanded case. If the
same issue is later presented to the Supreme Court, the Court will have the benefit of the lawyers'
and the lower court's analysis about the applicability of the possibly relevant case.
The Nevada Supreme Court was free on remand to decide whether Mennonite Bd. applied,
because no binding precedent existed on the constitutional question. On remand, the Nevada court
could have duplicated its earlier holding, but it could not reach the same result without having
considered and rejected the applicability of Mennonite Bd.
104. Moseley II, 100 Nev. 70, 683 P.2d 20.
105. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
106. Moseley II, 100 Nev. at 71, 683 P.2d at 21.
107. Even Moseley I was unique in that it expressly applied the Mullane balancing test to the
estate creditor nonclaim provision. No state court had applied the Mullane balancing analysis prior
to Moseley L Several state courts had concluded that Mullane should not apply at all in the creditor
nonclaim context. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. Of course, after applying Mullane's
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Traditionally, state courts had summarily dismissed the notion that Mul-
lane might apply in the context of notice to creditors in probate proceedings. 10 8
Typical of this -state court treatment was the Nevada Supreme Court's statement
sixteeni years earlier in Continental Coffee Co. v. Estate of Clark,109 that "[w]e
are not convinced that [the Mullane] doctrine has applicability to our non-claim
statute." 1 10 In two more recent cases, state appellate courts have applied more
exhaustive analyses to deny application of Mullane to their nonclaim statutes.
In Gano Farms, Inc. v. Estate of Kleweno, 111 the Kansas Court of Appeals
stressed that in the probate creditor context no "'property rights are brought
before a court for adjudication.' "112 The Gano Farms court also distinguished
several United States and Kansas Supreme Court decisions 113 on their facts:
In each case the effect sought to be given to the notice, at least as
to the property right involved, was the same as if the party had been
personally served and made a party to the proceeding, and in each a
specific, identifiable property right was the subject of the court's order.
The notice under the nonclaim statute, on the other hand, does
not make a creditor a party to the proceeding, but merely notifies him
that he may become one if he wishes. It does no more than put into
operation a special statute of limitations.
114
balancing analysis, the Nevada court reached the traditional conclusion that the publication notice
feature of the nonclaim statute was not constitutionally infirm.
108. See Brunell Leasing Corp. v. Wilkins, 11 Ariz. App. 165, 167, 462 P.2d 858, 860 (1969) (It
is not "constitutionally impermissible procedure [to] provid[e] for notice by publication in proceed-
ings in rem which ultimately settle claims of claimants not before the court."); Baker v. National
Bank of Henderson, 151 Mont. 526, 529, 445 P.2d 574, 576 (1968) (The court cited Continental
Coffee Co. v. Estate of Clark, 84 Nev. 208, 438 P.2d 818 (1968); Chalaby v. Driskell, 237 Or. 245,
390 P.2d 632 (1968); New York Merchandise Co. v. Stout, 43 Wash. 2d 825, 828, 264 P.2d 863, 864
(1953), as authority that the Mullane doctrine is not applicable to probate proceedings.); Chalaby v.
Driskell, 237 Or. 245, 248, 390 P.2d 632, 633 (1968) ("[W]e shall not attempt to explore the various
circumstances under which the Mullane doctrine is applicable to probate proceedings. It is enough
to say that we do not regard the doctrine as applicable to the present case."); New York Merchan-
dise Co. v. Stout, 43 Wash. 2d 825, 828, 264 P.2d 863, 864 (1953) (The court distinguished Mullane
as involving property rights.).
It is worth noting that none of these courts engaged in meaningful analysis of the due process
issue. The Brunell Leasing court even seemed to rely on the in rem/in personarn distinction that
Mullane had struck down as inappropriate to determine issues about notice to known potential
parties. See Brunell Leasing, 11 Ariz. App. at 167, 462 P.2d at 860. That the in rem/in personam
distinction has proved difficult to put to final rest also was evidenced by the decision in In re Shew's
Estate, 48 Wash. 2d 732, 734, 296 P.2d 667, 669 (1956) (publication notice held sufficient based on
the in rem nature of an estate proceeding).
109. 84 Nev. 208, 438 P.2d 818 (1968).
110. Id. at 213, 438 P.2d at 821. "
111. 2 Kan. App. 506, 509, 582 P.2d 742, 744-45 (1978).
112. Id. at 509, 582 P.2d at 744 (quoting New York Merchandise Co. v. Stout, 43 Wash. 2d 827,
828, 264 P.2d 863, 864 (1953))
113. Gano Farms, 2 Kan. App. at 509, 582 P.2d at 744. The United States Supreme Court cases
were Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S.
112 (1956); City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293 (1953). Four
Kansas cases also were cited and distinguished. Three of the Kansas cases involved tax or execution
sales: Weaver v. Frazee, 219 Kan. 42, 547 P.2d 1005 (1976); Chapin v. Aylward, 204 Kan. 448, 464
P.2d 177 (1970); Pierce v. Board of County, 200 Kan. 74, 434 P.2d 858 (1967). The other case was
In re Estate of Barnes, 212 Kan. 502, 511, 512 P.2d 387, 395 (1973), in which the court held that
notice of the probate of a decedent's will should have been mailed to known heirs or heirs whose
names and addresses should have been known.
114. Gano Farms, 2 Kan. App. at 509, 582 P.2d at 744. The court noted further that:
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The distinction first noted by the Kansas court between an adjudication, to
which Mullane was held to apply, and a statute of limitations, to which Mullane
was held not to apply, was expanded in a thoughtful and thorough opinion of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In In re Estate of Fessler1 15 the court held that
Mullane did not apply because the creditor's claim had been extinguished not by
adjudication, but "merely" by the operation of a statute of limitations. 1 6 The
operation of a statute of limitations to toll a claim, even the claim of one una-
ware of the time limit for filing a claim, did not offend the due process clause.
1 17
The most viable arguments against the applicability of Mullane in the
short-term nonclaim statute context are encompassed within the distinction be-
tween adjudication and limitations expressed in Gano Farms and Fessler
118 If
the short-term nonclaim statute operates merely as a statute of limitations then
Fessler is correct, and "the legislature may, consistent with notions of due pro-
cess, divest a person of his cause of action even though he may not precisely
know the time within which he must assert his claim to preserve it."'1 19 A po-
tential defendant need not inform a potential plaintiff when a true statute of
limitations is about to run, is running, or is about to expire.
120
C. The Supreme Court Cases
Mullane applies in very traditional judicial proceedings: a defendant is en-
titled to notice reasonably calculated to inform him that a plaintiff is seeking a
It is true that the creditor's claim will be barred if not presented before the statute runs, but
that is true of any statute of limitations. No order is entered which specifically bars the
claim unless, as here, the creditor seeks to enforce the claim after the statute has run.
Id.
115. 100 Wis. 2d 437, 302 N.W.2d 414 (1981).
116. Id. at 450-51, 302 N.W.2d at 420-21.
117. Id.
118. This distinction encompasses all the viable doctrinal arguments about finality, parties, and
the direct effect that the constitutionally questionable event has on a recognized property interest.
Adjudications are final, between parties, and have a direct effect on property interests in a different
way and to a different degree than do statutes of limitations. The only viable considerations not
encompassed in the adjudication-limitations distinction are the review of all the circumstances, the
balancing of the state and individual interests, and the evaluation of the practical effect of a better-
notice rule. These considerations are discussed in part III of this Article.
Other arguments that might be made against Mullane's applicability can be dealt with summa-
rily. First, the in rem nature of the probate proceeding is not itself any basis for approval of con-
structive notice under the circumstances. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 312-13. See Note, California Probate
Proceedings, supra note 8, at 1117-18. But see Brunell Leasing Corp. v. Wilkins, 11 Ariz. App. 165,
167, 462 P.2d 858, 860 (1969) ("notice by publication in proceedings in rem" is not unconstitu-
tional); In re Shew's Estate, 48 Wash. 2d 732, 734, 296 P.2d 667, 669 (1956) (publication notice
sufficient in an in rem proceeding). Second, limiting Mullane to its facts is not a valid argument. See
Comment, Due Process-The Requirement of Notice in Probate Proceedings, 40 Mo. L. Rnv. 552,
554 (1975); Note, Due Process of Law and Notice by Publication, 32 IND. L.L 469, 480, 488 (1957).
Third, Farrell v. O'Brien, 199 U.S. 89 (1905), does not support the proposition that due process does
not apply in a probate proceeding. Farrell involved the probate of a will, not a creditor's claim, and
is more than eighty years old. Fourth, the argument that succession to property is a privilege that
may be granted on any condition that the legislature proposes is met elsewhere in this Article, supra
notes 64-67, as is the argument that established practices establish the norm of due process protec-
tion supra notes 179-181.
119. Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d at 449-50, 302 N.W.2d at 420.
120. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 532-33 (1982).
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court order affecting the defendant's property rights.12 1 Mullane, however, has
not been limited to traditional adjudications. Notice reasonably calculated to
inform also has been required in proceedings that resemble statutes of limita-
tions in the same ways that nonclaim statutes resemble statutes of limitations.
122
Schroeder v. City of New York 123 involved a situation similar to the creditor
nonclaim situation. Schroeder arose when the City of New York acquired by
condemnation the right to divert a waterway.1 24 A statute provided that all
claims against the city based on the city's diversion of water would be barred
unless an injured party took affirmative steps to claim damages within three
years.1 25 The landowners injured by the city's acquisition of their water rights
were potential plaintiffs in a pending court proceeding; the city was a potential
defendant. Initiation of the condemnation proceeding set in motion a clock that
eventually would run to terminate plaintiffs' property interests if they failed to
assert those interests in time. 126 On these facts, the Court held that potential
claimants were entitled to better-than-publication notice of the diversion of their
water. 127
Estate creditors are in a position similar to that of the Schroeder claimants
121. Several adequacy-of-notice cases have involved traditional plaintiff-to-defendant notice.
For example, in Mullane better-than-publication notice was required to inform defendant trust bene-
ficiaries of a court proceeding initiated by a plaintiff trustee to determine finally certain of the rights
of the beneficiaries against the trustee. Id. In Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115-16
(1956), Mullane was applied to mandate better-than-publication notice of the hearing to determine
the compensation due a known landowner whose land was condemned by plaintiff. In Armstrong v.
Mango, 380 U.S. 545, 547 (1965), Mullane was applied to require notice to defendant father about
the pendency ofan adoption proceeding. In Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38,41 (1972), Mullane
was applied to require notice reasonably calculated to inform a defendant of the institution of an
auto forfeiture proceeding. In Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 447-51 (1982), Mullane was applied
to require better-than-publication notice to a defendant tenant who was being evicted from public
housing.
Mullane has been used to justify plaintiff-to-plaintiff notice. The Court in Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), mentioned Mullane when it decided that Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 23(c)(2) required better-than-publication notice to potential plaintiffs in a class action that
would settle the rights of all included plaintiffs against the defendant. The plaintiffs were entitled to
notice of a court order that set a date for them to object to inclusion in the class because if they did
not object, they would be bound by the court's judgment in the class action. The order in Eisen is
analogous to the order appointing the personal representative of an estate, which triggers the run-
ning of the claim-filing period. The Eisen Court's interpretation of Rule 23(c)(2) is relevant to Mul.
lane's applicability because: the Advisory Committee that drafted Rule 23 referred to Mullane as
the source of interpretation of the Rule; the Eisen Court used Mullane as the source of interpreta-
tion; and Eisen was cited in Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983), as relevant
to notice.
122. Mullane has been cited often in majority, plurality, and dissenting opinions of the United
States Supreme Court. It has been cited for the proposition that a hearing must be appropriate to the
nature of the case. E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 378 (1971). It has been cited generally to reiterate the fundamental proposition that the right to
be heard has little reality unless one is informed of the pendency of the hearing. E.g., Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 332, 339 (1969). It also has been cited in cases concerning deprivations
of liberty. E.g., Nevada v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2906 (1983); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Fox, 434
U.S. 1346 (1977); Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 502 (1972).
123. 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (unanimous decision).
124. Id. at 209.
125. Id. at 209-10 (ADMIN. CODE OF THE CrTY OF NEw YORK, tit. K41, § 18.0)




they are potential plaintiffs in a pending court proceeding.128 The court pro-
ceeding will decide who is entitled to specific property. 129 The decedent's per-
sonal representative and successors have interests analogous to those of the city
in Schroeder. The decedent's personal representative and successors are poten-
tial defendants in an action by the estate creditor. Estate creditors have a clock
running against them, a clock set in motion by a court order initiating the pro-
ceeding in which they are potential plaintiffs. When the clock runs out, their
claims will be barred without further order or notice. Thus, estate creditors, like
the Schroeder claimants, should be entitled to notice reasonably calculated to
inform them of the pendency of the proceeding in which the clock is running.
In Schroeder, the court proceeding to acquire property rights not only
caused the clock to run, it also created the claim that eventually would be
barred. 130 In this sense, Schroeder admittedly differed from an estate creditor
case; the court proceeding opening the estate does not create the creditor's
claim. Despite this difference, Schroeder undermines the argument that a poten-
tial defendant need not give a potential plaintiff notice that his claims will be
barred. Schroeder established that a potential defendant may be required to no-
128. The status of the estate creditor as a potential plaintiff has been used to support the conclu-
sion that estate nonclaim statutes are mere statutes of limitations that eventually bar the potential
plaintiff's claim if it is not timely asserted. See, eg., Gano Farms, Inc. v. Kleweno, 2 Kan. App. 506,
509, 582 P.2d 742, 744 (1978):
In each case the effect sought to be given to the notice, at least as to the property right
involved, was the same as if the party had been personally served and made a party to the
proceeding ....
The notice under the nonclaim statute, on the other hand, does not make a creditor a
party to a proceeding, but merely notifies him that he may become one if he wishes. It does
no more than to put into operation a special statute of limitations.
The Court cited Mullane, Schroeder, and City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. R.R. Co.,
344 U.S. 293 (1953). Gano Forms, 2 Kan. App. at 509, 582 P.2d at 744.
In Schroeder, however, as in New York, N.H. & H.I R.R., the notice was to be given to a
potential claimant, who, like the estate creditor, was to be told in the notice that he had to file a
claim in a pending proceeding within a designated amount of time or lose the claim. Schroeder, 371
U.S. at 214; New York, N.H. & H.R. R.R., 344 U.S. at 297. In each case, again as in the estate
creditor context, the effect was to notify the claimant that he could become a party if he wished. In
each case, as in the estate creditor case, if the creditor chose not to become a party, his claim would
be barred against the person who initiated the proceeding or on whose behalf the proceeding was
initiated. Thus, the Gano Farms distinction should not apply.
129. The Gano Farms court also distinguished Schroeder, New York, N.H. & HR. R.R., and
Mullane, stating that "in each a specific, identifiable property right was the subject of the court's
order." Gano Farms, 2 Kan. App. at 509, 582 P.2d at 744. In Schroeder and New York, N.H. &
H.R. R.R., the property subject to the court order was no more identifiable (and no more worthy of
protection from deprivation) than the enforceable debt or demand of an estate creditor. In Mullane,
the property was a cause of action, Mullane, 339 U.S. at 307; in Schroeder, an enforceable demand
for compensation from a condemning authority, Schroeder, 371 U.S. at 314; and in New York, N.H.
& H.R. R.R., a secured lien, New York; N.H. & HR. R.R., 344 U.S. at 294.
Furthermore, the court order in Schroeder and New York, N.H. & H.R. R.R. did not operate
any more directly on the property than does a court order in an estate proceeding. In each situation,
the court order about which the potential plaintiff was to be notified established a time period during
which the potential plaintiff should take steps to preserve his property interest. Although, as in New
York N.H. & H. R.R., another court order would be required to close a bankruptcy proceeding, in
the estate context a similar second order-a decree of distribution to close the estate proceeding-
would be issued. In both situations the later court order only would confirm the prior effective bar
of any claim not timely filed. In Schroeder, no further court order apparently was contemplated to
close the condemnation proceeding.
130. Schroeder, 371 U.S. at 314.
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tify potential plaintiffs of something similar to the running of a statute of
limitations.
New York v. New York N.H. & H.R. R.R. Co., 131 in which plaintiff's claim
was not created by the same proceeding that caused the clock to run, also under-
mines the assertion that a potential defendant need not notify potential plaintiffs.
A potential claimant in a bankruptcy proceeding was entitled, by statute, to
"'reasonable notice of the period in which claims may be filed,. . . by publica-
tion or otherwise.' "132 Citing Mullane, the Court held that publication notice
was inadequate to inform a creditor whose name and address were known.
1 33
The creditor, like an estate claimant, was only a potential claimant whose ex-
isting claim would be barred prematurely if not filed within the foreshortened
period.134 The claim-filing requirement arose in a statutorily authorized bank-
ruptcy proceeding, similar to the statutorily authorized estate proceeding.
135
Just as a bankruptcy proceeding is a proceeding to be accorded finality, an estate
proceeding also is a proceeding to be accorded finality. Therefore, Mullane
should apply in both contexts to require notice reasonably calculated to inform
known creditors of the pendency of the action.
Other notice cases, in which Mullane has been applied, demonstrate that
Mullane's applicability does not require a court's involvement or adjudication.
Thus, in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams13 6 the Court held that a mortga-
gee was entitled to better-than-publication notice of the tax sale of property on
which his mortgage was a lien. 137 Although the tax sale was initiated by a
county auditor without court involvement, the Court concluded that it was a
131. 344 U.S. 293 (1953) (unanimous decision).
132. Id. at 296 (quoting Bankruptcy Act, ch. 774, § 77(c)(8) 49 Stat. 911, 916 (1935) (repealed)).
As Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), see supra note 121, New York, N.H. & HR.
R.R. was primarily a case determining the intended dimensions of a statutory term-"reasonable
notice." The case, however, was cited in Mennonite Bd., along with Eisen, as relating to the notice
requirements of due process. Mennonite Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2707. Furthermore, due process would
require notice reasonably calculated to inform creditors of a claim-filing requirement in a bankruptcy
proceeding--even if the Bankruptcy Act had not stated the notice requirement. The fifth amend-
ment would provide the due process requirement for a federal bankruptcy proceeding.
133. New York, N.H. & H.R. .R., 344 U.S. at 296.
134. Id. at 295.
135. Similarities abound. Both proceedings are initiated only by a filing of a petition with the
court, either a bankruptcy petition or a petition to open a decedent's estate. Each petition results in
an adjudication-one an adjudication of bankruptcy, the other an adjudication of death. Each peti-
tion results in the appointment of an official fiduciary-a bankruptcy trustee, or a personal represen-
tative-each of whom often is supervised closely by the court. In each situation, an estate exists that
will be distributed to claimants only if they properly have filed their claims.
Differences also exist. For example, it is likely that in bankruptcy the fiduciary will be super-
vised judicially, while the administration of an estate may be informal or unsupervised. The degree
of judicial supervision, however, should not be determinative of whether the essential nature of the
proceeding is adjudicatory.
136. 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
137. Id. at 2711. Mennonite Bd. provided a recent response to the suggestion that Mullane may
have been applicable in Schroeder only because the notice was notice of an event that operated not
only to start a clock running, but also to create the claim on which the clock was running. In
Mennonite Bd., the tax sale operated, in one sense, to start a clock running after which the
mortagee's existing lien would be barred completely; however, the sale did not operate to create the
mortagee's lien in the first place. See id.
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proceeding to which Mullane was applicable.13 8 Similarly, in Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Division v. Craft139 the Court held that Mullane applied to define a
municipality's duty to notify its customers of procedures for protesting improper
handling of their accounts. 140
Mullane's applicability depends on the existence of a proceeding to be ac-
corded finality. In the estate context, the short-term nonclaim period begins to
run when the court appoints a personal representative and authorizes him to
embark on court-sanctioned duties. 141 The estate proceeding continues, often
with close court supervision, until the court issues an order of distribution and
discharges the personal representative. 14 2 The court order issued at the outset of
the estate proceeding alters an estate creditor's existing expectations about re-
payment of the decedent's debt;143 it will result in an expedited final termination
of the creditor's rights unless he knows about the estate proceeding and acts to
submit his claim. Thus, Mullane should apply, and the creditor should be enti-
tled to notice reasonably calculated to inform him of the proceedings and the
effect that failure to file a claim will have on his rights.
The estate proceeding in which a short-term creditor nonclaim provision is
invoked is similar in many respects to proceedings to which Mullane has been
applied. Stating that a nonclaim provision is merely a statute of limitations' 44
ignores the reality that the creditor's claim is being brought within the ambit of
a judicially invoked and supervised estate proceeding. To recover his claim, a
creditor must comply with the requirements of this judicially invoked and super-
vised proceeding. Those taking advantage of the process should inform him
about the new rules that apply to his claim' 45 -he should be given an actual
138. Id., 103 S. Ct. at 2711. The auditor could invoke the tax-sale procedures pursuant to those
statutes that described the preconditions to such a sale. Id. The preconditions for a tax sale include
an adjudication of deliquency by the county auditor, similar to the adjudication of death and domi-
cile (or ownership of property) necessary to obtain a court order to open an estate. The obvious
differences between the tax-sale proceeding and the estate proceeding, particularly the drastic and
immediate effect of the sale on the mortgagee's secured property interest, do not mean that an un-
secured estate creditor should not have notice of the operation of a statutory scheme that will reduce
drastically the value of his interest within a short time (two to six months).
139. 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
140. Id. at 13.
141. The personal representative in part becomes an officer of the court upon his appointment,
see T. ATKINSON, supra note 25, § 104, at 576, and thus could be deemed to be a state actor
analagous to the auditor in Mennonite Bd and the bankruptcy trustee in New York, N.H. & HR.
R.R.
142. Id. § 104, at 576-77.
143. Death modifies the expectations of a creditor only to the extent that a long-term nonclaim
provision operates. Invocation of a short-term nonclaim provision modifies the creditor's expecta-
tions even further.
144. If this is a mere statute of limitations, then, as a matter of fairness, this ought to be a statute
of limitations in which the debtor must notify the creditor-potential plaintiff.
145. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971) ("[D]ue process requires, at a mini-
mum, that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle
their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to
be heard."); see also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 181 (1974) (White, J., concurring and dissent-
ing) ("Similar principles prevail when the State affords its process and mechanism of dispute settle-
ment, its law enforcement officers, and its courts, in aiding one person to take property from
another."). In the estate creditor situation, the state is affording its process first to create a dispute
and then to settle it quickly and quietly.
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opportunity to be heard.
III. WHAT NOTICE IS DUE?
The Mullane Court defined the notice mandated by the due process clause
as "[n]otice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to inform inter-
ested parties of the pendency" 14 6 of the proceeding. The notice must be reason-
able "under all the circumstances," 14 7 with "due regard for the practicalities
and peculiarities of the case." 148 According to the Court "construction of the
Due Process Clause which would place impossible or impractical obstacles in
the way [of promoting vital interests of the state] could not be justified." 149
Two factors must be analyzed to determine what kind of notice will suffice.
First, a study of Mullane and its progeny reveals the characteristics of notice
reasonably calculated to inform under the circumstances. Second, consideration
of a statutory scheme that incorporates Mullane's notice philosophy illustrates
that enhanced notice is workable in the creditor nonclaim context and that such
expanded notice does not interfere with important state interests.
A. Notice Reasonably Calculated to Inform
In Mullane the trustee of a common trust fund sought a judicial settlement
of its accounts. 150 The trustee notified interested beneficiaries by publication in
a local newspaper pursuant to the provisions of the New York statute authoriz-
ing the common fund. 15 1 The published notice set forth only the following in-
formation, as required by the statute: the name and address of the trustee, the
date of establishment of the common fund, and the names of the 113 participat-
ing estates and trusts.1 52 Although the names and addresses of many of the
beneficiaries of the 113 participating estates and trusts were known to the fund's
trustee, 153 none received more than the publication notice required by statute.
The decree in the trustee's settlement action would have been "binding and con-
clusive as to any matter set forth in the account upon everyone having any inter-
est in the common fund or in any participating estate, trust or fund." 154
The Mullane majority held that the publication-notice provisions "of the
New York statute accorded due process to those beneficiaries whose addresses
146. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 313-14.
150. Id. at 307. A common trust fund is an entity, recognized by statute, into which the assets of
several small trusts administered by one trust company are pooled for investment efficiency.
151. Id. at 308.
152. Id. at 309-10. The Court stated: "The record does not show the number or residence of the
beneficiaries, but they were many and it is clear that some of them were not residents of the State of
New York." Id. at 309.
153. The trustee regularly had been sending income checks to many of the beneficiaries. Id. at
318. Furthermore, when the trustee made the first investment in the common fund on behalf of each
participating trust, the trust company, pursuant to statute, "had notified by mail each person of full
age and sound mind whose name and address were then known to it." Id. at 310.
154. Id. at 309.
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or interests were unknown to the trustee15 5 The statute, however, offended due
process "as a basis for adjudication depriving known persons whose wherea-
bouts are also known of substantial property rights."1156 The Court further
stated that notice by mail, reinforcing the publication, would be sufficient for
known beneficiaries.
1 57
Mullane did not hold that all known claimants in all actions were to be
accorded notice reasonably certain to reach them. The Court held only that
"notice and opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case" 158
must be provided. Determination of the type of notice that is "appropriate to
the nature of the case" involves a balancing of the state's interest in establishing
its notice rule and the individual interest protected by the due process clause.
15 9
The Mullane Court asserted that it had "not committed itself to any formula
achieving a balance between these interests in a particular proceeding or deter-
mining when constructive notice may be utilized or what test it must meet." 
160
Nevertheless, the Court disparaged the use of constructive notice:
It would be idle to pretend that publication alone, as prescribed
here, is a reliable means of acquainting interested parties of the fact
that their rights are before the courts. . . . Chance alone brings to the
attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type in-
serted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home
outside the area of the newspaper's normal circulation the odds that
the information will never reach him are large indeed. The chance of
actual notice is further reduced when, as here, the notice required does
not even name those to whose attention it is supposed to attract, and
does not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention. In
weighing its sufficiency on the basis of equivalence with actual notice,
we are unable to regard this as more than a feint.
1 61
The Mullane Court's disdain for constructive notice also is implicit in the
Court's statement that the means employed to give notice to one entitled to it
"must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reason-
155. Id. at 320. As to unknown persons, see Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 434-
35 (1951) (publication notice identifying the property and the last known owner was held adequate).
156. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 320.
157. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318. Mullane rejected argument that publication notice was sufficient
because of the in rem nature of estate proceedings:
But in any event we think that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the standards are so
elusive and confused generally and which, being primarily for state courts to define, may
and do vary from state to state.
Id. at 312; see generally supra note 108 (citing cases in which publication notice was held sufficient in
in rem proceedings). The Mullane Court also rejected the propriety of any different treatment for
residents and nonresidents in determining whether due process has been accorded. Id. at 313-14.
158. Id. at 313.
159. Id. at 314. See also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (considers three factors:
private interest affected; risk of mistaken deprivation of interest; government interest involved).
160. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, quoted in Mennonite Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2713 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
161. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, quoted in Mennonite Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2709-10, and Greene v.
Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 454 (1982).
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ably adopt to accomplish it."' 1 62
Since Mullane the Court has "adhered unwaveringly" to the principle that
publication notice is inadequate to inform known or ascertainable parties.
1 63
Publication notice was deemed inadequate to apprise known or easily discovera-
ble landowners of condemnation proceedings, 16 reasonably identifiable class
members of the pendency of a class action, 165 an incompetent individual (not
only known to be incompetent but also known to be without the protection of a
guardian) of the foreclosure of tax liens against her property, 166 and a bank-
rupt's creditor of the period in which claims could be filed against the bankrupt's
estate. 16 7 Similarly, the Court has held that due process requires more than post-
ing notice on the premises to inform a tenant of an impending forcible entry and
detainer action.
168
The Court most recently adhered to Mullane in Mennonite Board of Mis-
sions v. Adams,169 which dealt with the adequacy of publication notice to inform
a mortgagee with a properly recorded mortgage of the pendency of tax sale pro-
ceedings that eventually would nullify the mortgage. The Court held that publi-
cation notice, even supplemented by posting on the property and by mailed
notice to the owner of the property, did not accord due process to the recorded
mortgagee. 170
When the mortgagee is identified in a mortgage that is publicly re-
corded, constructive notice by publication must be supplemented by
notice mailed to the mortgagee's last known available address, or by
personal service. But unless the mortgagee is not reasonably identifi-
able, constructive notice alone does not satisfy the mandate of
Mullane.
17 1
As in Mullane172 and other cases, 173 the Court touted mail service as an "inex-
162. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315. The Court noted that publication may be sufficient if reinforced
by other conduct likely to attract the party's attention to the proceeding, such as "libel of a ship,
attachment of a chattel or entry upon real estate in the name of law [, all of which] may reasonably
be expected to come promptly to the owner's attention." Id. at 316. Additionally, the state may
assume that the owner of tangible property located in the state either has abandoned it or has left it
with a caretaker. If the property was abandoned, the proceeding will deprive the owner of nothing;
if the property was not abandoned, the state may assume that a caretaker exists who will inform the
owner of the proceedings. See id.
163. Mennonite Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2710 (6-3 decision).
164. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (unanimous Court); Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) (two justices-Frankfurter and Burton-dissented).
165. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1976) (case interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 with
reference to Mullane, decided by 6-3 vote; however, the Court was unanimous on the notice issue).
166. Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956) (under the circumstances, publication was
inadequate even as supplemented by posting and mailing).
167. City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293 (1953) (case decided
by 7 to 2 vote; however, the Court apparently was unanimous on the notice issue) (Bankruptcy Act
interpretation with reference to Mullane).
168. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982) (case decided by 6-3 vote).
169. 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983) (case decided by 6-3 vote).
170. Id. at 2711.
171. Id.
172. 339 U.S. at 319.
173. See, eg., Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982).
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pensive and efficient mechanism," more reliable than publication and posting. 174
That the persons to be notified were "sophisticated," with the means at their
disposal to "discover" the pendency of the proceeding, did not sway the
Court. 17 Additionally, the Court was unpersuaded by the practical argument
that the mortgagees could have protected themselves better by contractual pro-
visions in the mortgage documents.
176
Thus, the Court's decisions indicate that publication is never notice reason-
ably calculated to inform interested persons of the pendency of a proceeding
when the names and addresses of those persons are known or can be ascertained
with reasonable diligence. Instead, mailing of notice to a person's last known
address is required. The Court, however, apparently has not discarded a balanc-
ing test for the adequacy of notice. All notice requirements have been assessed,
impliedly if not expressly, with "due regard for the practicalities and peculiari-
ties of the case," with due regard for their effect on important state interests, and
with due regard for their reasonableness under the circumstances. 177 The bal-
ance in all the discussed cases has favored better-than-publication notice.
B. Better-Than-Publication Notice to Estate Creditors
Whether the due process clause should mandate better-than-publication no-
tice to known estate creditors cannot be assessed fully until the effect of a better-
notice rule is evaluated. Such an assessment must include an identification of
the important state interests underlying the current notice rules as well as an
analysis of the impact a different notice rule would have on the achievement of
legitimate state purposes. Ultimately, the Constitution will not and should not
command a better-notice rule unless it is fair and workable.'
t
A better-notice rule would reverse years of established tradition in which
the adequacy of publication notice has been presumed. Established practices
and procedures would have to be altered if better-than-publication notice were
required, and some well-settled rules would have to be modified or discarded.
Nevertheless, the existence of this tradition of publication notice and the
174. Mennonite Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2711.
175. Id. at 2712. Notice reasonably certain to provide actual notice "is a minimum constitu-
tional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any
party, whether unlettered or well versed in commercial practice, if its name and address are reason-
ably ascertainable." Id. The dissenters would have defined the constitutional obligation of the state
with reference to the "party's ability to protect its interest." Id. at 2714 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
176. The dissenters pointed out that the mortgagee could have exercised greater care to protect
his own rights. For example, it "could have required that [the mortgagor] provide it with copies of
paid tax assessments, or could have required that [the mortgagor] deposit the tax monies in an
escrow account, or could have itself checked the public records to determine whether the tax assess-
ment had been paid." Id. at 2716-17 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissenters believed that
"[w]hen a party is unreasonable in failing to protect its interest despite its ability to do so, due
process does not require that the state save the party from its own lack of care." Id. at 2717
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority, however, felt that "a party's ability to take steps to safe-
guard its interests does not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation." Id. at 2712.
177. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. It also has been stated that "[t]he very nature of due process
negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation."
Local 473, Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
178. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
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realization that changes, even substantial ones, may have to be made to accom-
modate a better-notice rule should not preclude or stifle a reexamination of the
fairness and constitutionality of publication. 179 Furthermore, the settled status
of publication notice should not increase significantly the burden on those seek-
ing to show its unconstitutionality; 180 practices should not be protected or im-
munized from constitutional challenge merely because such practices are well
established.
18 1
1. The State Interests Involved
The principal state interest underlying the enactment and interpretation of
short-term nonclaim provisions is an interest in the expeditious settlement of
estates.182 The broad state interest favoring speedy settlement of estates implic-
itly includes an equally strong interest in finality 183 A strong interest in the
accuracy of the settlement underlies each of these policies-an interest in ensur-
ing that the estate is distributed to the intended recipients. At times, however, in
the formation of estate administration rules and policies, accuracy consciously
has been compromised in the interests of administrative efficiency and final-
ity.18 4 Short-term nonclaim statutes that require only publication notice to in-
terested parties illustrate that accuracy of distribution consciously has been
deemed less important than the interests in speed and finality. Thus, the goal of
estate administration today is not payment of all just debts. Instead, the goal is
payment of only those just debts that are filed properly within a short time after
the decedent's death, with distribution of the remaining assets to heirs and
devisees.
The individual creditor's interest lies in the integrity of his relationship with
the debtor. The individual creditor wants to be certain that no event will modify
or impair this relationship significantly without his knowledge. The creditor
179. The Court has stated that the due process clause is "flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 476, 481 (1972),
cited in Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 5 (1981).
180. But see In re Pierce's Estate, 245 Iowa 22, 60 N.W.2d 894 (1953).
181. Compare Jackson v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 24 (1922) ("If a thing has been practised
for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment
to affect it. . . .") with Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969) ("The fact that a
procedure would pass muster under a feudal regime does not mean it gives necessary protection to
all property in its modem forms.").
182. See In re Estate of Kingseed, 413 N.E.2d 917, 923 (Ind. App. 1980) ("[I]t is now a well
established policy of law. . . that estates shall be settled as speedily as possible."); Kusserow v. Blue
Cross-Blue Shield, 140 Vt. 328, 335, 437 A.2d 1114, 1118 (1981) ("The law limiting the presentation
of claims against a decedent's estate is intended to advance the swift and orderly distribution of that
estate.").
183. See Allan v. Allan, 236 Ga. 199, 223 S.E.2d 445 (1976).
184. For example, policies regarding the establishment of a parent-child relationship between an
illegitimate child and his father for purposes of intestate succession usually sacrifice accuracy for
speed and finality. See, eg., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); IND. CODE § 29-1-2-7(b) (Bums
1972). In Lal, a New York statute that required a judicial determination of paternity to establish
the parent-child relationship between father and illegitimate son was upheld against equal protection
attack. The dissenting justice stated: "All interested parties concede that Robert Lalli is the son of
Mario Lalli. . . Yet, for want of a judicial order of filiation entered during Mario's lifetime, Robert




especially is interested in protection against such an event when the event's oc-
currence or control is within the knowledge or control only of persons with
competing interests.
The individual creditor's interest in receiving notice of the invocation of the
short-term filing period seldom is served by publication notice. A better-notice
rule, on the other hand, would satisfy the individual's interest if it afforded him
actual notice. In any case enhanced notice nearly always would satisfy the indi-
vidual creditor's interest better than a mere publication-notice rule.
The state's efficiency and finality interests are served when publication no-
tice is the sole method of notifying creditors of short-term filing periods. The
effect of a better-notice rule on the state's interests, however, is not so clear. To
discuss the effect of such a rule, one first must put forth a better-notice rule that
supports the state's efficiency and finality interests as fully as possible. The effect
of the proposed enhanced-notice rule on the state's interests then can be
evaluated.
2. A Better-Than-Publication-Notice Rule
It is essential to understand initially that the Constitution requires neither
that every creditor have the same period of time in which to prepare and file a
claim, nor that any creditor have the entire short-term period in which to pre-
pare and file a claim. Therefore, notice to a creditor is not a constitutional pre-
requisite to the initiation of the short-term period.' 8 5 Publication of notice or
court appointment of a personal representative can establish the beginning date
of the short-term period for all creditors, known and unknown.18 6 It would be
best to have the period begin at the same time for all creditors in any given estate
in the interests of speed, finality, and order.
Six distinct questions provide the analytic framework for a notice rule that
would afford due process and at the same time protect the state's speed and
finality interests as fully as possible. First, what method of giving notice should
be used? Due process requires notice reasonably calculated to inform; to be
calculated to inform the notice must.be calculated to be received.18 7 Second, to
whom should the notice be given? Due process does not require notice to per-
sons with merely conjectural or valueless interests.1 88 Third, what information
should the notice contain? Due process requires that the notice convey sufficient
information to afford the creditor an opportunity to prevent the deprivation of
his rights.18 9 Fourth, when should the notice be given? Due process requires
185. Accord Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (notice was required that a
claim-filing period was running; by implication such notice not essential to the initiation of general
expiration of the nonclaim period).
186. A jurisdiction could continue to use the beginning event that it now uses, whether triggered
by publication or appointment. No compelling reason exists to prefer one to the other.
187. "The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
188. "Nor do we consider it unreasonable for the State to dispense with more certain notice to
those beneficiaries whose interests are either conjectural or future. . . ." Id. at 317.
189. The notice must reasonably apprise interested parties of the pendency of the proceeding and
of the imposition of a claim-filing requirement. See generally Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v.
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that the notice must afford a reasonable time for the interested person to make
an appearance. 190 Fifth, what is the effect of failure to give the required notice?
Usually, lack of due process invalidates a proceeding as to the affected person. 191
Last, are there special circumstances in which failure to give notice will be ex-
cused? A due process violation might be deemed de minimis in the estate credi-
tor context.
192
a. Method of giving notice. -Estate creditors whose names and addresses
are known or can be ascertained with reasonable diligence should be notified by
the mailing of notice to each creditor's last known address.
193 In Mullane19 4
and Mennonite Board'95 mailed notice was touted by the Court as a constitu-
tionally acceptable alternative to notice by publication or posting. 196 Mailing of
notice to the creditor's last known address is the method most likely to reach the
creditor; often, mailing is the only method likely to reach the creditor at all.
19 7
As the Court in Mullane noted, one "desirous of actually informing" a known
creditor with a known address almost always would choose the mails, as op-
posed to publishing notice in a newspaper or some other method of notice. 198
Many short-term nonclaim provisions include a requirement that the pub-
lished notice be mailed to heirs and devisees.19 9 The interest of the heirs or
devisees competes with the interest of a creditor of the decedent's estate because
the heirs or devisees share only what is left of the estate after the payment of
Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (notice must inform interested party of opportunity to present objec-
tions); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (the "timing and content of the notice . . . will
depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved.").
190. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
191. Most of the cases simply have been reversed and remanded. See, eg., Mennonite Bd., 103 S.
Ct. at 2712; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 320.
192. See infra part III(B)(2)(f).
193. The only viable methods are mailing, publication, and posting. In the estates context, the
creditor has no specific property that he should be monitoring; thus, posting is useless as an informa-
tive device. For the same reason, no steps are available, other than mailing, that would reinforce
posting or publication notice. Thus, the creditor's case cannot fail within an area in which "publica-
tion traditionally has been acceptable as notification supplemental to other action which in itself may
reasonably be expected to convey a warning." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316.
194. "However it may have been in former times, the mails today are recognized as an efficient
and inexpensive means of communication." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319.
195. "The. . . use of these less reliable forms of notice is not reasonable where, as here, 'an
inexpensive and efficient mechanism such as mail service is available.'" Mennonite Bd., 103 S. Ct. at
2711 (quoting Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982)). Mennonite Bd. held that mailing was
required by due process: "When the mortgagee is identified in a mortgage that is publicly recorded,
constructive notice by publication must be supplemented by notice mailed to the mortgagee's last
known available address, or by personal service." Id. at 2712.
196. See also Schroeder v. City of New York. 371 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1962) quoted in, Walker v.
City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956) ("Even a letter would have apprised him.").
197. The only possible alternatives to mailing are publication or posting; in the estates context,
the only practical, viable alternative is publication. See supra note 193. Publication in more than
one newspaper would increase the chances that the creditor will discover the publication. Publica-
tion in any newspaper, however, will reach only those creditors who might read that newspaper.
Publication in a local newspaper would be as effective as mailing only in rare cases, such as for those
creditors who regularly read estate notices in the appropriate newspaper or those who learn of the
debtor's death and therefore are encouraged to read the estate notices to discover if and when an
estate has been opened.
198. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
199. See supra note 46.
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creditors' claims. Thus, heirs or devisees normally would not be inclined to
share claim-filing information with potential creditors of the estate. Personal
notice to heirs or devisees therefore cannot be considered sufficient notice likely
to lead to actual notice to all estate creditors;2 0° however, notice actually mailed
to heirs and devisees affords due process to those claimants who have a claim
against the estate.
201
Publication notice, as it currently is used in most jurisdictions, would be
sufficient for those estate creditors whose existence or whereabouts is un-
known.20 2 The Mullane court recognized the sufficiency of publication notice in
such circumstances:
This Court has not hesitated to approve of resort to publication as a
customary substitute in another class of cases where it is not reason-
ably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning. Thus it
has been recognized that, in the case of persons missing or unknown,
employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notifi-
cation is all that the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar
to a final decree foreclosing their rights. ... However great the odds
that publication will never reach the eyes of such unknown parties, it is
not in the typical case much more likely to fail than any of the choices
open to legislators endeavoring to prescribe the best notice
practicable.
20 3
b. Recipients of notice.-Mailed notice must be sent to the last known ad-
dress of creditors whose names and addresses are known or knowable with rea-
sonable diligence. Identity of the proper recipients of mailed notice requires a
determination of who is creditor and a determination of who is a known or
knowable creditor.
200. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
201. In Indiana, for example, a copy of the published notice must be mailed to heirs or devisees
listed in the petition to probate the will or the petition to appoint an administrator. IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 29-1-7-5(2), 29-1-7-7 (Burns Supp. 1983). No sanction is imposed, however, if a known
heir or devisee is not listed and therefore gets no mailed notice. See, eg., Anson v. Estate of Anson,
399 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. App. 1980) (failure to list and mail notice to known devisee until two days
before expiration of claim-filing period did not affect running of the period.). But see Vogel v. Katz,
64 Ill. App. 2d 126, 212 N.E.2d 295 (1965) (Reasonable diligence is required to discover the identity
of heirs and devisees to be listed on the petition.); Hesthagen v. Hartby, 78 Wash. 2d 934, 481 P.2d
438 (1971) (personal representative liable for loss caused by his failure to notify heirs whose names
and addresses were ascertainable with reasonable diligence).
202. The Mullane Court listed the following situations as those in which publication would be
acceptable: persons "missing or unknown"; persons "whose interests or whereabouts could not with
due diligence be ascertained"; and persons "whose interests are either conjectural or future." Mul-
lane, 339 U.S. at 317. See also City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. R.R. Co., 344 U.S.
293, 296 (1953) ("But when the names, interests and addresses are unknown, plain necessity may
cause a resort to publication."); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951) (publication
sufficient to inform unknown owners of property subject to escheat).
Whenever the estate assets are sufficient to pay creditors, publication would be a practical neces-
sity to establish jurisdiction over unknown creditors; such notice would be sufficient to render the
decree of distribution of the estate final as to them. See generally Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S 235,
241 (1958) (under state statute, notice by publication was sufficient constructive service of process on
unknown natural person). Additionally, if the beginning of the short-term claim-filing period is tied
to the date of the first published notice to creditors, publication notice always would be necessary to
invoke the short-term period.
203. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317.
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i. Who is a creditor?-The current definition of claims that will be barred if
not filed within the filing period can be used to define creditors entitled to mailed
notice. All known or knowable creditors with barrable claims should be given
mailed notice. In most jurisdictions, claims are barred even if they are not yet
due, contingent, unliquidated, or founded in tort.2° 4 Although property claim-
ants and lien claimants do not have barrable claims to the extent of their prop-
erty interest or lien they nevertheless must follow the claim-filing rules to assert
a claim over and above the property interest or lien. Thus, a lien holder with a
potential deficiency between the value of the security and the amount of the debt
ordinarily must file a claim to preserve his right to a deficiency judgment against
the decedent. 20 5 Similarly, a property owner may recover possession of his
property from the estate without filing a claim, but must file to preserve his right
to damages for wrongful detention or use of his propety. Because of potential
deficiency or damages claims, known or knowable property interest claimants
and lien claimants should be sent mailed notice. Mailed notice also should be
sent as a matter of practice to known or knowable joint obligors, partners, land-
lords, bailees, credit card issuers, charge account creditors, professional advi-
sors, ex-spouses with alimony or child support claims, tort claimants, 20 6 and any
other known or knowable person who might have a claim against the decedent's
estate.
207
In Mullane the Court found it reasonable "to dispense with more certain
notice to those beneficiaries whose interests are either conjectural or future.
'208
The trust beneficiaries who were notified, however, had interests very similar to
the interests of the beneficiaries not notified.20 9 Thus, objections asserted by the
204. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
205. This statement assumes that contingent claims not yet due are barred under the particular
nonclaim statute.
206. Tort claims illustrate a special problem. Notice of a tortfeasor's death might induce a tort
victim to file an action that otherwise would have been forgotten or abandoned. This possibility will
not excuse notice. See infra note 253 and accompanying text. Two classes of tort claimants clearly
are not entitled to notice: those whose claims are covered by insurance, because their claims would
not be barred by failure to file, see supra note 55 and accompanying text; and those whose claims
would be barred by the running of a statute of limitations before the expiration of the claim-filing
period, because they are not deprived of property as a result of the operation of the nonclaim provi-
sion. Other tort claimants should be given notice if they are discoverable with reasonable diligence
and if the nonclaim provision will be asserted as a bar. Personal representatives might be permitted
the choice of giving no notice and awaiting the expiration of the statute of limitations or the long-
term nonclaim period. See infra part III(B)(2)(f) and accompanying text.
207. Any creditor who would be paid even if he did not file a claim need not be given notice. See
infra note 250 and accompanying text. Any creditor whose claim would be barred by the running of
a statute of limitations before expiration of the claim-filing period need not be given notice because
operation of the claim-filing provision would not deprive that creditor of property. Reasonable con-
ditions probably could be imposed in a new nonclaim statutory scheme and still pass muster under
Mullane. Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2988 n.5 (1983) (statutory scheme provided for seven
categories of unwed fathers to whom notice had to be given). For example, mailing could be excused
and publication deemed sufficient for claimants with claims below a specific amount of money or
below a specific percentage of the estate or those with claims against estates below a specific gross
amount.
208. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317.
209. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317. The Court noted:
This type of trust presupposes a large number of small interests. The individual interest
does not stand alone but is identical with that of a class. The rights of each in the integrity
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notified beneficiaries would serve to protect the interests of the beneficiaries who
were not notified. Similarity of interest ordinarily does not exist among estate
claimants, particularly when an estate is insufficient to pay all claims. It there-
fore may not be reasonable to dispense with enhanced notice to claimants with
conjectural claims against an estate.
ii. Who is a known or knowable creditor?-In deciding who is a known
creditor, a crucial preliminary issue is whose knowledge is important. Is the
actual knowledge of the personal representative the only actual knowledge that
counts, or should that of heirs, devisees, or others also count? At one extreme,
the personal representative could be someone who knows little or nothing about
the personal and financial affairs of the decedent. No creditor will be a known
creditor to that representative. At the other extreme, the personal representative
could be someone who is intimately familiar with the personal and financial af-
fairs of the decedent. Many creditors will be known to that representative. In
some cases heirs, devisees, or acquaintances will know nothing about the dece-
dent's affairs; in other cases heirs, devisees, or acquaintances will be familiar
with the details of the decedent's financial circumstances.
The existence of these potential extremes of actual knowledge on the part of
personal representatives, heirs, devisees, or others must be considered in fashion-
ing appropriate rules defining known or knowable creditors. The rules that are
fashioned neither should reward the successors of a decedent who chooses a
personal representative with no actual knowledge nor punish the successors of a
decedent who chooses a personal representative who possesses a substantial de-
gree of actual knowledge. The rules regarding whose knowledge will be consid-
ered also should not encourage appointment of a personal representative other
than the one the decedent otherwise would have chosen.
A fair and workable rule, therefore, would depend only preliminarily on the
actual knowledge of the personal representative. The actual knowledge of the
personal representative must be supplemented by the knowledge that would be
gained by a diligent investigation of the decedent's financial affairs. Reasonable
diligence would include: a timely search of the decedent's home, office, and safe
deposit box; an investigation of the books and records uncovered by the search,
including the decedent's tax returns; and an inquiry of those of the decedent's
relatives, acquaintances, business associates, and professional advisers whom the
representative believes to be fertile sources of information.2 10 The concept of
reasonable diligence would charge the personal representative with the actual
knowledge of the decedent's heirs, devisees, and acquaintances.
of the fund and the fidelity of the trustee are shared by many other beneficiaries. Therefore
notice reasonably certain to reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to safe-
guard the interests of all, since any objection sustained would inure to the benefit of all.
Id. at 319. Cf. Mennonite Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2709 (notice to owner did not give actual notice to
mortgagee of the impending tax sale).
210. Due diligence was contemplated by Mullane. The Court stated that publication notice was
adequate as to "[t]hose beneficiaries.. . whose interests or whereabouts could not with due dili-
gence be ascertained." Id. The identity of fertile sources of information may be uncovered in the
personal representative's search for, and investigation of, the decedent's books and records.
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Theoretically, it therefore would be irrelevant whether the personal repre-
sentative began with any actual knowledge of the decedent's financial affairs.
Assuming that the personal representative uses reasonable diligence in making
inquiries and that the inquiries result in honest answers, the personal representa-
tive's ultimate knowledge should be the same whether he began with much or
little actual knowledge.211 In practice, however, the actual knowledge of the
personal representative may make a difference unless clear liability rules are de-
veloped to ensure that the two preceding assumptions are as accurate as possible.
To ensure that personal representatives use reasonable diligence in finding
creditors, the personal representatives should be liable to pay the claim of any
creditor who should have been discovered, notified, and paid by the estate.
212
This potential liability should assure reasonable diligence on the part of any per-
sonal representative who is aware of his duty of diligence.
213
To ensure that inquirees will respond honestly, dishonest or nonresponsive
inquirees also should be held liable to pay the claim of any creditor who would
have been discovered, notified, and paid by the estate if the inquiree had re-
sponded to reasonable inquiry.214 This liability rule may be called into play
frequently by personal representatives who are making inquiries and wish to
impress upon the inquirees that an honest and complete response must be given.
211. The only exception would be the rare case in which the personal representative was the only
person with certain information and in addition was a person that no other reasonably diligent
personal representative would have consulted as a potential source of information.
212. The personal representative also should be liable for interest from the time the creditor
should have been paid by the estate. Alternatively, the personal representative could be liable for all
damages proximately caused by his breach of duty, including all foreseeable consequential losses to
the creditor. Liability for damages would impose a greater burden on the personal representative
than liability to pay the claim plus appropriate interest. To establish the personal representative's
liability, the creditor should meet the burdens of proof discussed infra notes 235-39 and accompany-
ing text.
213. Professional personal representatives will know about this duty; lay personal representatives
may not. At the time of appointment, the court should emphasize the importance of all the fiduciary
duties to the lay personal representative. Bonds should become more important as creditor-related
duties are increased.
214. See, eg., Hesthagen v. Harby, 78 Wash. 2d 934, 481 P.2d 438 (1971) (beneficiaries who
failed to discover existence of heirs may be liable to them under constructive trust theory). Ideally,
this duty should be expressed clearly in a statute that imposes a better-notice rule. The inquirce
could be held liable for all damages proximately caused by the breach of duty to disclose relevant
facts; this liability could be onerous. Alternatively, liability could be limited to payment of the
creditor's claim to the same extent that the claim would have been paid out of the estate assets. A
third possibility would be to limit liability to the value of the property received from the estate by the
inquiree who failed to disclose relevant.facts; however, that would eliminate recovery from one who
deceived the personal representative to get a greater share of the estate for another. The best solu-
tion is to require payment of the creditor's claim, plus appropriate interest, to the same extent that
the claim would have been paid out of the estate's assets. To establish the inquire's liability, the
creditor should meet the burdens of proof discussed infra notes 235-239 and accompanying text.
Special problems of establishing and apportioning liability will arise when more than one in-
quiree has breached a duty to disclose information that would have led to discovery and notification
of a creditor. Similar problems will arise if the personal representative's breach of duty contributed
to the failure to discover the creditor. All breaching parties could be jointly and severally liable to
the undiscovered creditor; or liability could be based on the relative innocence of the breaching
parties. An inquiree whose information would have led, not directly to discovery of a creditor, but
indirectly to an otherwise unknown source of additional information, could be liable to the creditor,
but not to the same extent as an inquiree who intentionally failed to name a creditor known to him.
Neither of these inquirees should be liable to the same extent as a professional representative who
failed to exercise reasonable diligence.
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Because those with knowledge are often those who will benefit financially by not
sharing it,2 15 liability rules must be developed to encourage honest responses to
the personal representative's reasonable inquiries; otherwise, creditor notice
rules could be avoided.
2 16
c. Content of notice.-Due process requires that the mailed notice inform
the known creditor of the facts necessary to give him an opportunity to prevent
deprivation of his rights.2 17 The mailed notice would be sufficient if it included
the same information that currently is contained in the publication notice: that
the decedent has died; that an estate has been opened in X Court, Y County, Z
State, under N Docket Number; that the personal representative of the estate is
P; and that creditor's claims must be filed within T time after D date or be
barred against the estate and the decedent's successors.
2 18
The mailed notice also should include the exact date of the beginning and
the end of the claim-filing period. It would be illogical to require a mailed no-
tice, intended to inform a known creditor of the need to file a claim or be barred
forever, but then permit that mailed notice to omit essential information about
the time for filing---especially if the time for filing is within the 6aowledge of the
personal representative. In any jurisdiction in which the nonclaim period cur-
rently begins to run on the court's appointment of the personal representative,
the mailed notice could be simply a reproduction of the published notice; no new
document would be needed. In jurisdictions in which the nonclaim period cur-
rently begins to run on publication of notice to creditors, the mailed notice could
not be a reproduction of the published notice and still include the exact date of
the beginning and end of the claim-filing period. Thus, in those jurisdictions in
which publication starts the period running, a new document would have to be
created for mailing.
2 19
Whether the notice is a copy of the published notice or a new document, it
need not be tailored for or directed to any individual creditor. The notice also
need not describe the kind of claim which the personal representative suspects
that particular creditor has or might have. The notice should not suggest that
the recipient actually is a creditor or that a particular claim, if filed by the credi-
tor, likely would be approved or paid.
d. Timing of notice.-Mullane required that "notice reasonably calculated
215. The estate creditor's situation can be contrasted to a bankruptcy creditor's. In bankruptcy,
the debtor's best interest is to identify all the creditors of whom he is aware so that he can be
discharged completely from his obligations.
216. Creditor notice rules could be avoided by dishonest successors of decedents who have not
kept accurate and organized books and records. The disorder may be the result of carelessness or
the result of an intentional attempt to mislead and confuse. Regardless of the reason for the disor-
der, successors of the disorganized decedent should not be rewarded for the decedent's disorder.
217. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) ("purpose of notice
under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the affected individual of. . .an impending 'hearing' ");
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975) (The "timing and content of notice will depend on appropri-
ate accommodation of the competing interests involved.").
218. The content of the current publication notice is not objectionable constitutionally. The
objection is to the way the message is delivered.
219. A copy of the published notice easily could be supplemented by the addition of the date of
publication.
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[to inform] ... must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their
appearance. '220 In an estate administration setting, this would mean that notice
would have to be given in time to afford creditors an opportunity to prepare and
present their claims within the short-term period.
The personal representative should begin a review of the decedent's books
and records immediately on appointment. Ideally, this review will identify all of
the known or knowable creditors soon after the decedent's death so that notice
can be given well within the claim-filing period. Unfortunately, the ideal will
not always occur; consideration only of the ideal does not take into account the
practicalities and peculiarities of estate administration.
The decedent may not have kept accurate or organized records.221 Fur-
thermore, the disorganized decedent may not have discussed his or her financial
affairs with anyone, so that no one person has accurate knowledge about the
decedent's debts and obligations.2 22 Even with the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence, the name and address of a creditor may not be discovered in time to
afford the creditor an opportunity to prepare and present a claim within the
short-term period.
A workable notice rule would conclude that those creditors whose names
and addresses cannot be discovered with the exercise of due diligence within a
reasonable time prior to the expiration of the short-term claim-filing period are
not entitled to mailed notice.223 Given the strong state interests in speedy and
final settlement of estates, a reasonable time limitation would be appropriate and
constitutional in the estate administration setting.224 Definition of a reasonable
time could be left to the courts, but case-by-case assessment would result in
uncertainty. Thus, a reasonable time should be defined specifically in a
statute.2
25
A sensible approach would be to require mailed notice only to creditors
whose identity and address were discovered within the defined reasonable time
prior to expiration of the claim-filing period. Providing notice after expiration of
the claim-filing period to a creditor whose name and address were not discov-
ered within it would produce nothing but litigation between the creditor and the
estate over the issue of the personal representative's due diligence.
226
220. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
221. The decedent may be a carelessly or intentionally disorganized decedent. See supra note
217.
222. Alternatively, the disorganized decedent may have discussed his financial affairs with heirs
or devisees who may be slow to share information about creditors if they realize that their share of
the decedent's estate will be greater if the creditors remain unknown and unknowable.
223. This statement assumes that a creditor's claim is barred if it is not filed within the claim-
filing period. The reasonable time period should be tied to the event that bars the creditor's claim.
224. The Court in Mullane found it reasonable "to dispense with more certain notice to those
beneficiaries whose interests. . ., although they could be discovered upon investigation, do not in
due course of business come to the knowledge of the common trustee." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317.
225. The specified time period should be short, for example, 10 or 20 days, but should include a
reasonable time for a creditor to file a claim after the mailed notice was likely to reach him. If the
creditor's existence or address is discovered after the specified time for notice but before the claim-
barring event, notice by telephone could be required.
226. If the creditor's name and address could not have been discovered in the exercise of reason-
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e. Failure to give notice.-Failure of the personal representative to give ade-
quate notice to a creditor may result from his failure to use reasonable diligence
to discover the name and address of the creditor. Failure to give notice also may
result despite the personal representative's reasonable diligence, if those with
knowledge otherwise unavailable to the personal representative fail to respond to
his inquiry, or if no reasonably available facts existed that would have led to the
discovery of the name and address of the creditor.
227
Several situations involving failure to give notice are easy to resolve. First,
if the creditor who was not given mailed notice nonetheless filed a claim within
the short-term period, no one should be held liable to that creditor for breach of
the duty to give notice. The creditor has suffered no damages for the technical
breach of duty. Second, if the creditor's name and address were not discoverable
by the use of reasonable diligence within the claim-filing period, the personal
representative had no duty to send mailed notice to that creditor. Last, if the
creditor fails to file a claim within the short-term period, either because the per-
sonal representative breached his duty of reasonable diligence or because an in-
quiree did not respond openly and honestly to the personal representative's
inquiry, the personal representative or the inquiree may be liable to pay the cred-
itor's claim.
228
The question that must be addressed is whether a creditor who was entitled
to mailed notice but was not given it may assert his claim successfully against
the decedent's estate or the decedent's innocent successors. The resolution of
this question is important, particularly in light of the state's interest in speedy
and final distributions of decedent's estates. The finality interest is disserved to
the extent that a creditor may assert a claim against the decedent's successors
after distribution of the estate.
22 9
Generally, if due process is not accorded, the person deprived of due pro-
cess is not bound by the action.230 Thus, a creditor who was not given notice to
which he was entitled could argue that he should be able to assert a claim
against the decedent's estate-or against the decedent's successors if the estate
has been distributed-without regard to whether he filed his claim within the
claim-filing period. If this argument prevailed, the finality interest would be dis-
able diligence, this litigation will do nothing but deplete estate assets. The undiscoverable creditor is
not entitled to notice. If the creditor's name and address should have been discovered within the
claim.filing period, then any litigation produced by the late notice would be productive. Notice
rules, however, should protect diligent personal representative from unproductive litigation.
227. Persons with knowledge of relevant facts could be unavailable temporarily. Unavailability
could pose a problem if it continued for a substantial portion of the claim-filing period. The law
might provide that the creditor takes the risk of inadvertent temporary unavailability, but that the
creditor's notice rights are protected if the unavailability is intentional. Modem communications
methods should make absolute unavailability a fairly rare occurrence.
228. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text (discussion of the personal representative's
liability); supra note 214-16 and accompanying text (discussion of the inquiree's liability).
229. The interest in expeditious settlement also could be affected, but the effect could be positive.
Placing carefully chosen time limitations on the assertion of a denial of due process might encourage
the speedier settlement of decedent's estates. See infra note 233 and accompanying text. Another
question is whether the aggrieved creditor could recover from innocent junior creditors.
230. See Mennonite Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2712; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 320.
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served by a better-notice rule in every case in which better notice should have
been given, but was not.
In the context of a decedent's estate, however, the broad application of this
general proposition would be inappropriate. Other rules should operate to place
limits on the ability of a creditor to assert an unfiled claim against the estate.
Thus, an unnotified creditor should be required to discover and assert his claim
within the applicable statute of limitations.231 Furthermore, an unnotified credi-
tor reasonably could be required to assert his claim within the long-term claim-
filing period, measured from the decedent's death, regardless of notice and of the
time of the running of the short-term period.232 Alternatively, it also is reason-
able to require that an unnotified creditor assert his claim against the estate
while the estate remains open; this limitation might encourage even speedier
settlements of estates than does the present law.
233
A mailed notice requirement therefore does not have to interfere substan-
tially with the state's interests in finality and expedition. Applying a reasonable
limitations period would not disserve the finality interest but would only post-
pone it, even in an estate in which the personal representative failed to use due
diligence.
234
The unnotified creditor who seeks payment without having filed a timely
claim should have the burden of proving certain facts to establish his right to
payment from the estate, the personal representative, the decedent's successors,
or dishonest or uncooperative inquirees. 235 The creditor would have to prove
that his claim was valid and enforceable-a burden he would have had to carry
even if he had filed a timely claim. Furthermore, the creditor should have to
prove that he asserted a claim within the reasonable limitations period adopted
231. If the general statute of limitations expires during the claim-filing period, the creditor
should be required to assert his claim either within the limitations period or within the long-term
nonclaim period, regardless of notice. If the creditor is a known creditor and has not received notice
of the opening of the estate and has attempted to assert his claim against the decedent within the
limitations period, he could properly be allowed a longer time to file his claim in the court or with
the personal representative.
232. The long-term claim-filing period could be established as the statute of limitations applica-
ble to all claims of due process violations or other irregularities in the estate proceeding; a shorter
time, if it is reasonable, also could be chosen.
233. It would be possible to relegate the unnotified creditor to an action against the personal
representative (individually or on his bond) after the estate is closed. The speedy settlement of es-
tates might be discouraged if the personal representative could be sued individually by creditors after
estate distribution, but could not be sued while the estate remained open. A personal representative
might await the expiration of other statutes of limitations before distributing the estate.
234. Some jurisdictions already have provisions that disserve the finality interest. See, eg., IND.
CODE ANN. § 29-1-1-21 (Burns Supp. 1983) ("For illegality, fraud or mistake, upon application filed
within one year after the discharge of the personal representative upon final settlement, the court
may vacate or modify its orders, judgments and decrees or grant a rehearing therein."). The finality
interest is disserved not only to the extent that the estate could be reopened and previously distrib-
uted property forceably returned to it, but also to the extent that the personal representative or the
decedent's successors could be found liable after the decree of distribution and discharge.
235. But see Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965). The Armstrong Court held that a hear-
ing was not meaningful for due process purposes when the burden of proof was shifted from what it
would have been if the party to be notified had appeared earlier and presented his objections. Id. at
547. Thus, in establishing reasonable burdens of proof for the unnotified estate creditor, he must not




in the jurisdiction.236 Lack of timeliness could be a matter of affirmative de-
fense, as with any limitations period, or timeliness could be an element of the
creditor's cause of action.
The creditor should be required to prove affirmatively that he had no
knowledge of the opening of the estate and the invocation of the claim-filing
period in time to file a claim. 237 A creditor who had such knowledge should be
deemed to have waived his rights against the estate or successors. 238 The credi-
tor also should be required to prove that property existed in the estate out of
which the claim could have been satisfied.
239
A creditor who is not given proper notice also should be directed to pursue
his remedies against the personal representative, the estate, or others in a desig-
nated order. The decedent's innocent successors should be liable to the creditor
only to the extent that the creditor is unable to recover against the personal
representative who failed to use reasonable diligence, 24° or against any dishonest
inquirees. Innocent successors also should be held liable only to the extent that
they received estate property gratuitously. 24 1
236. See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
237. This requirement would have to be phrased carefully. For actual knowledge to defeat the
creditor's action, the creditor would have to have had actual knowledge of the opening of the estate.
Mennonite Bd. supports the argument that notice of death is not the same as notice of the opening of
an estate and the running of a claim-filing period. In an analogous situation in the tax sale context,
the Court in Mennonite Bd. stated that "a mortgagee's knowledge of delinquency in the payment of
taxes is not equivalent to notice that a tax sale is pending." Mennonite Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2712. Thus,
notice of a pending tax sale was required in Mennonite Bd. regardless of the mortgagee's knowledge
or access to knowledge of the delinquency in taxes. Notice of the pending estate administration and
the running of the nonclaim period likewise should be required regardless of the creditor's knowl-
edge of the debtor's death. In the estate context, if a creditor had actual knowledge of the claim-
filing period, and the creditor did not file a timely claim against the estate, one could conclude that
the creditor had chosen to waive his rights to be paid out of the estate.
A different question is raised when the creditor had actual knowledge of the opening of the
estate, but had no idea of the claim-filing requirement. Is it reasonable to assume that everyone
should know the law; that is, everyone should know that a short-term claim-filing requirement is tied
to the opening of an estate? If it is reasonable to assume that everyone knows the law, the next
logical use of the assumption would be in assessing the proper content of notice. If it is assumed that
everyone knows of the short-term filing period, then notice would be sufficient if it merely informed
the recipient of the opening of an estate, without any mention of the need for, or the time limitations
on, filing of claims. Both applications of a presumption of knowledge of the law are inappropriate.
238. The creditor might be required to allege, but should not have the burden to prove, that his
name and address were or could have been discovered by the use of reasonable diligence within the
claim-filing period. Proof of diligence should be a matter of defense whenever the personal represen-
tative is a party defendant. Even if inquirees are defendants, the burden of proving diligence logi-
cally should be placed on them. The creditor usually will not have access to as much relevant
information as the personal representative or the inquirees.
239. If no such property existed, the creditor would have been deprived of no property entitle-
ment by the lack of due process. In ajudicially supervised estate, this information will be a matter of
public record in the decree of distribution. In an estate in which information about estate property
does not exist in a public decree of distribution, the burden of proving insufficient property might
best be placed on the defendant.
240. The creditor could be required to prove that he could not recover against the representative
either personally or on his bond; or he could be required to raise the issue as a defense.
241. The liability of innocent successsors could be limited to the value of estate property that
they still owned or those proceeds that are identifiable when the creditor either notified them of his
claim or filed suit. Collusive sales and transfers--or those sales and transfers entered into merely to
avoid liability--could be deemed ineffective to reduce the successor's liability. Bona fide purchasers
should be protected.
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Reasonable burdens and risks, as described above, could be developed to
strike a fair balance between a better-notice requirement and the state's finality
interest. A creditor who did not get the notice due him gets too much if he can
use his lack of notice as a threat either to reopen a settled estate proceeding or to
sue the successors individually unless he must meet basic burdens of proof and
persuasion.
f Excuse of Notice.-If the estate had insufficient assets to cover the costs
of making reasonable searches and of mailing notice, the assets would be insuffi-
cient to pay any creditors' claims that are filed. If the estate is so insolvent as to
be unable to pay any creditors' claims, the burdens of enhanced notice should
not be imposed. Publication notice also should be excused and creditors claims
should be deemed barred. If the estate has assets available to pay creditors'
claims, the estate could be granted the option either to invoke the short-term
filing period-with its attendant and expensive publication, due diligence, and
mailed notice requirements-or to await the expiration of the long-term period,
with none of the attendant expenses. If the estate has assets to pay some but not
all creditor's claims, notice to creditors whose claims cannot be paid should be
excused. If additional assets are discovered, however, the unnotified creditors
should be given notice and an opportunity to share in the newly discovered
assets.
g. Miscellaneous Considerations. -The creditor could waive the right to
mailed notice prior to or after the decedent's death,2 42 and existing rules regard-
ing whether the personal representative had the right to waive the filing period
could continue under a better-notice rule.2 43 Nothing suggests that better-notice
rules should be retroactive,244 and nothing commends a change in rules prevent-
ing an extension of time for a claimant's infancy or insanity.245
3. Effects of a Better-Notice Rule
The proposed, better-notice rule would increase the burdens on the per-
242. Assuming that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, the creditor could not have
been deprived of a property entitlement by lack of due process once he waived his right to notice.
243. See supra note 50 and accompanying text for the existing waiver rule.
244. See generally Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1939)
("all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified"); Allan
v. Allan, 236 Ga. 199, 208, 223 S.E.2d 445, 452 (1976) (decision to make law prospective balances
constitutional interests with people's reliance on old probate law); Klinger v. Kepano, 635 P.2d 938,
946 (Hawaii 1981) (because of potential impact on tax deed-based land titles, decision not retroac-
tive). In Klinger, the court restricted the applicability of its holding "to the instant case and to other
cases in which a complaint questioning the constitutional adequacy of notice. . . had been filed as of
the date of this decision." Id. at 946. In an estate setting, a court which held that publication notice
was inadequate could restrict its holding to estates opened after, or to estates opened for decedents
who died after, the date of the decision. Similarly, a new statutory scheme of better-than-publication
notice could limit its application to those estates of decedents dying after the effective date or to
those that were opened after the effective date.
245. If the personal representative is aware of a claimant's "inexperience or incompetence," then
"particularly extensive efforts to provide notice may often be required." Mennonite Bd., 103 S.Ct. at
2712 (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1978), and Covey v.
Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1956)). In Covey, even mailing of notice of a tax foreclosure
was held insufficient when the "person was known to be an incompetent who is without the protec-
tion of a guardian." Covey, 351 U.S. at 146.
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sonal representative by requiring reasonable and timely diligence in the discov-
ery of creditors,2 4 6 requiring the preparation of envelopes (and perhaps
documents) for mailing to the discovered creditors,2 47 and imposing personal
liability on the personal representative to pay the claim of the creditor if the
personal representative breaches his duty to use reasonable diligence.2 48 The
courts also may be required to accept a slightly increased burden to ensure that
the reasonable diligence requirements are satisfied. At the outset of an adminis-
tration, the court should emphasize the duties of the personal representative,
especially if the personal representative is not familiar with the responsibilities of
his position. When administration is complete, the court should inquire for the
record about the representative's diligence. An inquiry into diligence, perhaps
by requiring an affidavit of diligence or by a due-diligence hearing, should be
made a standard feature of the final accounting and decree of final distribution.
If a hearing is held, an aggrieved creditor should be entitled to participate as a
party if he wishes. He also could be joined as a party against his will.
These burdens will not interfere substantially with the expeditious and final
settlement of estates. The "reasonable diligence" duties of the personal repre-
sentative certainly make his responsibilities greater. Even under a publication
notice rule, however, a diligent personal representative would conduct a similar
review of the decedent's books and records-as well as an inquiry of the dece-
dent's relatives and business associates-in the course of collecting assets, dis-
covering the identity of heirs or devisees, and investigating the validity of timely
filed claims. Under an enhanced-notice rule all that would be required are a few
more questions to be added to those already asked of relatives and friends, and a
new list that would include debts as well as assets. The due diligence require-
ment thus would not add as many new chores as it first appears, and the in-
creased potential liability should not affect a personal representative who
documents his diligent efforts to locate creditors.2 49
Other possible problems of personal representatives under a better-notice
rule may be anticipated. Some will complain that a mailed notice requirement
would require notices to the electric company, telephone company, gas com-
pany, water company, landlord, credit card issuers, ad infinitum. Such notices
would be wasteful and useless as to any creditors who would be paid regardless
of filing, either by the personal representative or by the decedent's successors.
2 50
The law, however, does not require the doing of useless things. Notice need not
246. Careful personal representatives will document their diligence, and this documentation may
further increase the burdens on the personal representative.
247. Mailing rarely will render publication unnecessary. Therefore, all the chores incident to the
mailing of notice will increase the burdens without any corresponding reduction of costs.
248. Bonds may be required more often and in more cases, and the bonds may be more expensive
given the personal representative's increased liability. To ensure that the better-notice rule operates
as fairly as possible, an increased burden also would be imposed on dishonest or uncooperative
relatives and acquaintances of the decedent-they would be held liable to the creditor for damages
suffered as a result of failure to answer honestly the reasonable inquiries of the personal
representative.
249. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text for discussion of the potential liability of the
personal representative who is not diligent.
250. See Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97
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be sent to a creditor who would be paid in full regardless of filing; any creditor
who is paid in full will not be able to show deprivation of a property entitlement
resulting from inadequate notice.
Any discoverable creditors who would not be paid if they did not file
claims, including the utilities, the credit card issuers, and the landlord, would be
entitled to mailed notice.251 The personal representative's search for, discovery
of, and notification to these creditors is a small task compared to the task that all
creditors would have to undertake to discover the need to file claims.
252
A second concern that must be anticipated is that a better-notice rule would
promote litigation and thereby interefere with and disserve the state interest in
the speedy settlement of estates. In many respects the better-notice requirement
requires that a potential defendant notify a potential plaintiff that the plaintiff
should sue. This kind of notice almost certainly would promote litigation,
which in turn would delay the settlement of estates.
One response to this concern is that the enhanced-notice requirements im-
posed in Mullane and its progeny could promote more active litigation than
would have been promoted without them. By increasing the awareness of possi-
ble litigants any better-notice requirement will promote litigation despite the
state's interests in suppressing it.
The notice to creditors, however, will not invite the recipient to file a claim
and will not indicate to the recipient that he has a valid claim. The notice will
provide general information about the basic facts that any creditor would need
to know if he intended to file a claim and should be in a form that looks as if it
has been directed to many appropriate individuals and organizations. To the
extent that receipt of such notice encourages the recipient to consider whether
the recipient has a claim that should be asserted against the decedent's estate,
the notice will have performed its precise function. It will promote litigation
and delay only to the extent that this consideration by the recipient results in the
filing of a claim that otherwise would not have been filed. If the filed claims are
valid and easily determined to be so, however, litigation and delay will not oc-
cur; the claim will be allowed and if assets are available the creditor will be paid.
Therefore, the better-notice requirement will result in increased litigation and
consequent delay only to the extent that questionable claims that otherwise
would not have been filed are pursued in court after disallowance in whole or in
HARV. L. REv. 1108, 1120-25 (1984). Langbein suggests that many creditors are paid voluntarily by
the decedent's successors, perhaps more because of moral considerations than legal ones.
251. Such a burden is not overwhelming. Postage today for even 100 envelopes would be a mere
$22.
252. Mailing individual notices is not the only constitutionally acceptable method of notifying
creditors of the need to file a claim within the filing period. Mailing is merely one example, touted
by the Supreme Court, of an inexpensive and effective method of providing the best notice practica-
ble. It is possible to imagine a case in which local radio advertisements or properly placed posters,
telephone calls, or handbills might be equally as effective as mailed notice under the circumstances.
Methods of notice other than mailing could be appropriate in the case of the death of a notable and
newsworthy individual, or of a local businessman with a large number of potential local creditors. A
statutory better-notice scheme could authorize exceptions to mailed notice under extraordinary cir-
cumstances when the personal representative can convince the court that alternative means would





This litigation and delay, however, results because due process was afforded
to all creditors, including those with clearly valid demands and those willing to
assert and pursue questionable claims. Each creditor has been entitled to choose
for himself to have a day in court against the estate, just as he would have been
entitled to choose to pursue his claim against the decedent during the decedent's
lifetime. The interest in speedy and expeditious settlement cannot justify secrecy
and lack of meaningful notice in the estates context merely because of the possi-
bility of unjustified contentiousness any more than an interest in speedy dispute
resolution could justify lack of notice in a condemnation action, bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, or action to settle a trustee's accounts. Speed and expedition should
give way to due process. This especially is true in an estate proceeding in which
the victims of the speedy settlement are persons whom the decedent had a legal
obligation to pay.
The costs of administering decedent's estates will rise with a better-notice
requirement. Personal representatives will have to spend more time complying
with (and documenting compliance with) the reasonable-diligence requirement.
Bonds probably will be more prevalent and more costly with the increased credi-
tor-related duties. The increased administration costs, however, eventually
should be counterbalanced by decreased costs of credit. A better-notice rule
essentially effects a transference of the risks of nonpayment from the creditor to
the debtor's successors. Thus, donees, rather than persons who gave value for
their "share" of the decedent's estate, will bear the costs and risks.
Ultimately, the reasonable-diligence requirement and the mailed-notice re-
quirement are not likely to interfere significantly with the final and reasonably
expeditious settlement of a decedent's estate. Interference with speedy settle-
ment occurs only to the extent that the creditor pursues a questionable claim
that he would not have pursued without notice.
Interference with finality occurs only if reasonable diligence is not used or
inquirees are unresponsive, and only if the creditor's name and address could
have been discovered in time if reasonable diligence had been used or proper
responses had been given.25 4 The personal representative or the inquiree who
failed to perform his duties is primarily responsible for the interference with
finality and should be held primarily liable.
Thus, a better-notice rule would not place impracticable or impossible ob-
253. The real risk is that persons with very questionable claims will be more likely to pursue
them in hopes of a compromise.
254. The nonclaim period still will run from the date of appointment of the personal representa-
tive or the date of the first published notice. If the creditor's existence and address are discovered by
due diligence in time to mail notice to the creditor within a reasonable time prior to expiration of the
claim-filing period, then the reasonable diligence requirement will not interfere with finality. If the
creditor's name or address cannot be discovered with reasonable diligence within a reasonable time
prior to the end of the claim-filing period, then the creditor is entitled to no notice; the claim-filing
period expires and finality has not been disserved. The creditor might be more likely to pursue a case
for payment, even under a better-notice rule with substantial burdens of persuasion placed on him,
than he would have been under the traditional rule, in which publication was assumed to be ade-
quate. Thus, some interference with finality may occur as an indirect consequence of creating bur-
dens that are met more easily.
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stacles in the way of achieving vital state interests. At the same time, such a rule
would provide creditors with the process they are due. A better-notice rule
therefore is workable because it adequately meets the requisites of all parties to
an estate administration proceeding.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has acknowledged in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
and Trust that in proceedings to be accorded finality due process demands notice
sufficient to inform interested parties and afford them the opportunity to be
heard. The Nevada Supreme Court's holding in Contintental Insurance Co. v.
Moseley was the first recognition that this fundamental due process right must
inhere to estate nonclaim provisions. Estate proceedings cannot use tradition
and inertia to justify unfairness. Known and knowable creditors should be given
better-than-publication notice of a judicial event that will impair or destroy their
property entitlements. A workable statutory scheme could provide for better
notice and at the same time serve the important state interests of speed and
finality in estate proceedings. A better-notice requirement would be fair and
practical.
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